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Abstract
Demographic change and automation are two main structural trends shaping the 
macroeconomy in the next decades. We present a general equilibrium model with 
a tractable life-cycle structure that allows the investigation of the main transmission 
mechanisms by which demography and technology affect economic growth. Due to 
a trade-off between innovation and automation, lower fertility and population ageing 
lead to reductions in GDP per capita growth and the labour income share. During the 
demographic transition, the extent growth and factor shares are affected depends on 
alternative labour market confi gurations and scenarios for the integration of robots 
in economic activity.
Keywords: population ageing, automation, innovation.
JEL classifi cation: O31, O40, J11.
Resumen
Los cambios demográfi cos y una nueva ola de innovación y de automatización 
son dos de las principales tendencias estructurales que confi gurarán el escenario 
macroeconómico en las próximas décadas. Utilizando un modelo de equilibrio general 
con una sencilla estructura demográfi ca, investigamos los principales mecanismos 
de transmisión por los cuales la demografía y la tecnología afectan al crecimiento 
económico. Debido a una disyuntiva entre innovación y automatización, una menor 
fertilidad y el envejecimiento poblacional generan una reducción en el crecimiento del
PIB per cápita y en la participación de los salarios en el PIB. Durante la transición 
demográfi ca, la medida en la que el crecimiento y la participación de los factores se 
ven afectados depende de las diferentes confi guraciones del mercado laboral y de 
escenarios para la integración de robots en la actividad económica. 
Palabras clave: envejecimiento poblacional, automatización, innovación.
Códigos JEL: O31, O40, J11.
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1On the empirical literature on the employment and wage effects of automation see Graetz and Michaels
(2018), Acemog˘lu and Restrepo (2017a), Dauth et al. (2017) and Frey and Osborne (2017). On the relation
between the labour income share and automation, see Martinez (2018) and Bergholt et al. (2019).
1 Introduction
Demographic – baby boomers reaching retirement age, a fall in fertility, and the
continuous rise in longevity – and technological changes – the new wave of auto-
mation brought by developments in robotics and in artificial intelligence – are two
structural trends that will frame the macroeconomic context in the next decades.
The implications of these trends for economic growth are the subject of much debate.
On the one hand, population ageing is found to be associated with lower interest
rates, less innovation activity, and lower output growth (Aksoy et al. (2019), Gor-
don (2012) and Derrien et al. (2018)). On the other hand, Acemog˘lu and Restrepo
(2017b, 2018a) argue that it may give incentives to automation and, hence, to hi-
gher productivity and growth, although it may also decrease employment and the
labour income share.1
We analyse the macroeconomic consequences of demographic and technological
changes in a general equilibrium model in which both population dynamics and re-
search and development (R&D) determine long-run growth. R&D comprises of two
activities: innovation, which involves the creation of new products, and automation,
which is the development of production processes that allow robots to replace la-
bour. Although demographic changes, resulting from lower fertility and mortality,
boost automation, we find that they eventually lead to lower growth of GDP per
capita.
The primary source of growth in our framework is the origination of new goods
that increase overall productivity (productivity effect). By creating new goods,
innovation also creates new job opportunities (reinstatement effect). Eventually,
as robots are more productive than labour, automation increases productivity but
destroys jobs (displacement effect).
We identify three key channels through which demographic changes affect the
economy. First, changes in labour supply affect factor prices (wages and the price of
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of population, the arrival
(BGP ) — defined as a dynamic equilibrium with constant factor shares. We exclude
divergent paths by imposing a restriction on the efficiency of robots production. Si-
milarly to Aghion et al. (2017), we prevent a labour-free singularity by restricting the
productivity gain of an essential input (robots), sustaining its relative price in terms
of the final good. Ultimately, as the economy develops and gains in complexity, the
robots that are capable of replacing labour in the production of an increasing variety
of goods must also become harder to produce. Without this restriction, automation
generates full robotisation of production with the price of robots converging to zero.
We show that if the economy is on a BGP , then a fall in fertility generates a
new BGP with lower GDP per capita growth, a higher degree of automation, and a
lower labour income share. Since on a BGP the pace of innovation and automation
are matched, the creation of new goods, which initially must be produced employing
labour, is the main source of technological change. A fall in labour supply growth
leads to a decrease in the incentive to innovate, pushing output growth down. Fur-
thermore, the incentive to automate increases as the labour supply growth falls,
thus the robots income share increases and the labour income share falls. Even
holding population constant, an increase in longevity entails lower interest rates,
more automation, and a lower labour income share on the new BGP .
Embedding the demographic projections for the United States (US) and Europe
for the next decades into our model allows us to quantify the contribution of de-
mographic changes to medium-run economic trends in these regions. Lower fertility
arrivalthe
rate of new goods is also affected.
robots), altering the relative profitability of labour-intensive and automated sectors,
and, hence, the incentives to innovate and automate. Second, demographic changes
affect savings and the interest rate, altering the amount of resources available for
investment in capital accumulation, innovation, and automation. Third, insofar as
the efficiency of R&Dmay depend on the age structure population, the
Automation, by re-allocating production from a labour-intensive sector to an
automated sector, can eventually generate an imbalance between the labour and
growthrobot income shares, preventing the economy from reaching a dbalance path
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 9 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2004
and higher longevity lead to higher automation both in the US and in Europe, with
a stronger effect in Europe, which is consistent with the available data on robot
density. Despite the positive effects of automation, as resources are diverted from
innovation, population changes lead to lower output growth in the medium run,
even without a fall in the efficiency of the R&D sector (as in Bloom et al. (2017)).
Our results indicate that demographics reinforce three observed trends in the past
decades: the fall in real interest rates (Aksoy et al. (2019) and Eggertsson et al.
(2019)), the fall in labour income shares (Elsby et al. (2013), and Karabarbounis
and Neiman (2014)) and the fall in the price of robots (Graetz and Michaels (2018)).
We extend the model to consider different labour market configurations and
ways robots integrate in economic activity. We consider that (i) workers may move
towards the R&D sector boosting labour supply in R&D during the demographic
transition, (ii) the retirement age rises as longevity increases, (iii) automation also
generates an increase in the relative productivity of robots; and (iv) robots also re-
place labour in R&D. Although in all cases the long-run effect on per-capita growth
is the same as in the benchmark model, during the transition the relative fall in
GDP per capita is mitigated, with the different labour market configurations ha-
ving a more significant impact. When the retirement age increases to maintain the
ratio of the duration of the working life and the retirement constant, demographic
changes no longer generate an increase in automation, benefiting mostly older wor-
kers employed in production. In contrast, allowing young workers to migrate to
the R&D sector leads to higher income and automation, benefiting mostly young
workers employed in R&D.
We relax the restriction on the efficiency of the production of robots, which
ensures that factor prices and ultimately factor income shares do not diverge, in
the medium run only enforcing it in the long run. Thus, the efficiency of robots
production initially increases as automation rises. Under this scenario, the price
of robots falls more significantly, diverging from the path of wages. A reduction in
robot prices further boosts automation. As a result, the share of output produced in
the automated sector increases markedly while the labour income share falls. This
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 10 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2004
happens at the cost of resources being diverted from innovation, which eventually
leads to a sizeable fall in GDP per capita growth. Thus, a ‘robocalypse scenario’,
resembling the immiseration equilibrium of Benzell et al. (2015), may arise.
A different outcome occurs when the individual effective labour supply is no
longer constant as in the benchmark case but changes endogenously as a function
of the degree of automation or the level of capital deepening (thus adding economy-
wide capital-skill or automation-skill complementarities). The negative implications
for growth of the demographic transition may be mitigated, both in the short and in
the long run, although for that to happen labour skills must increase substantially
to offset the fall in labour supply due to lower fertility. In such scenario automation
no longer increases due to demographics.
The key mechanism driving the results in all specifications is the trade-off bet-
ween innovation and automation. Automation crowds out innovation, and, as the
former is a subsidiary activity of the latter, automation cannot progress indefini-
tely without innovation. In this regard, the assumption that newly created goods
need to necessarily be produced employing labour implies that labour constrains
the creation of new goods, ultimately controlling productivity gains and growth.
Relaxing this assumption may generate demographic transitions in which the share
of labour income falls and per-capita output growth increases, hence, exacerbating
the inequality between the production factor remunerations.
In what follows, we describe the model (Section 2), discuss the characteristics
of the BGP and present the comparative analysis results (Section 3). Section 4
focuses on transitional dynamics, looking at the medium-run effects of demographic
changes in the US and Europe. Section 5 discusses a set of extensions of the baseline
model. Section 6 concludes.
The model economy consists of three sectors, goods production, R&D, and robot
production, and households. The goods production sector comprises of a final good
2 The Model
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Households face two idiosyncratic risks: i) loss of wage income at retirement and ii)
time of death. There is a perfect annuity market allowing retirees to insure against
time of death by turning their wealth over to perfectly competitive financial inter-
mediaries that invest the proceeds and pay back a return of Rt/ω
r
t−1,t for surviving
retirees. Households are risk neutral, so that uncertainty about the time of retire-
ment does not affect optimal choices. Nevertheless, there is consumption smoothing
since preferences belong to the recursive utility family (Epstein and Zin (1989) and
Farmer (1990)), such that risk neutrality coexists with a positive elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution.
2.1 Households
There are Nt households, divided amongst two age groups: workers (w) and retirees
(r). ωyt,t+1N
w
t new households are born every period as workers. Workers (N
w
t )
retire with a probability 1− ωw, and retirees (N rt ) die with a probability 1− ωrt,t+1.
Thus,
Nwt+1 = ω
y
t,t+1N
w
t + ω
wNwt , and N
r
t+1 = (1− ωw)Nwt + ωrt,t+1N rt . (1)
producer, who aggregates a continuum of intermediate differentiated goods i ∈ Zt,
produced by combining inputs (final goods), capital, and either labour or robots.
R&D involves two activities: innovation and automation. Innovation creates new
goods or varieties (Romer (1990) and Comin and Gertler (2006)) that are added
to the set Zt of intermediate goods, and which, initially, can only be produced
by labour. Automation develops procedures such that existing intermediate good
i could be produced by robots. The set of goods produced by robots is denoted
At ⊂ Zt. Robots are machines created in the robot production sector, that are then
used in the production of intermediate goods.
As in Gertler (1999), households, who supply labour, accumulate assets and
consume the final good, face two stages of life, mature (working) and old (retire-
ment). Thus, fertility, longevity, and retirement drive population dynamics.
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2This is to reflect the fact that innovation productivity peaks during the first 10-15 years of a workers life
(see Jones (2010)).
3All equilibrium conditions are described in the Appendix.
The resulting consumption functions of workers and retirees are:3
Cw,t = ςt[RtFAw,t +Hw,t +Dw,t], and Cr,t = εtςt[RtFAr,t +Dr,t]. (6)
NwLt+1 = ω
y
t,t+1N
w
t (1− SwRD) + ωwNwLt + (dropRD)ωwNwRDt . (5)
with WRDt and Wt denoting respectively wages in the R&D and in the production
sectors.
For z = {w, r}, the household j selects consumption and asset holdings to maxi-
mise
V jzt =
{
(Cjz)υ + βzt,t+1(Et[V
j
t+1 | z]υ)
}1/υ
(2)
subject to Cjzt + FA
jz
t+1 = R
z
tFA
jz
t +W
j
t I
z + dzt (3)
where βzt,t+1 is the discount factor, which is equal to β for workers and βω
r
t,t+1 for
retirees, Rzt is the return on assets, which is equal to the real rate Rt for workers
and Rt/ω
r
t−1,t for retirees, W
j
t is the real wage for worker j, and I
z is an indicator
function that takes the value of one when z = w and zero otherwise. Thus, we
assume that retirees do not work and each worker’s labour supply is fixed. FAjzt
and dzt denote, respectively, the assets acquired and the dividends from the financial
intermediary.
A fixed share SwRD of new workers ω
y
t,t+1N
w
t is employed in R&D and the
remaining (1 − SwRD) supplies labour to intermediate firms. At every period a
fraction dropRD of R&D workers, who do not retire, is no longer able to work in this
sector, and, thus, start supplying labour to firms in the production sector.2 Hence,
employment in the R&D and labour-intensive sectors are, respectively:
NwRDt+1 = ω
y
t,t+1N
w
t SwRD + (1− dropRD)ωwNwRDt , and (4)
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2.2 Production
A final producer combines intermediate goods (which are substitutes) according to
yt =
[∫ Zt
0
yi,t
ψ−1
ψ di
] ψ
ψ−1
,where ψ > 1. (7)
Each firm i ∈ [0, Zt] produces a differentiated good that is sold to the final
producer. A subset i ∈ At can be produced using inputs (Υi,t), rented capital
(Ki,t) and robots (Mi,t) or labour (Li,t). Robots are more productive than labour,
and, thus, if a good can be produced by robots, the firm selects to do so. For the
remaining goods, i ∈ Zt \ At , production can only be done using inputs (Υi,t),
where, Hw,t is the present value of human capital, Dz,t is the present value of
dividends for z = {w, r}. ςt denotes the marginal propensity of consumption of
workers and εtςt the one for retirees (where εt > 1). As marginal propensities to
consume are different across ages, changes in the distribution of asset holdings as
well as in the population age structure, affect aggregate demand. Moreover, the
marginal propensities to consume are functions of fertility (ωy), longevity (ωr) and
time of retirement (ωw). Thus, through changes in savings, demographics affect the
equilibrium interest rate.
Finally, labour supply is a function of fertility (ωyt,t+1), the share of new workers
entering the R&D sector (SwRD) and the retirement age (ω
w). In our benchmark
specification changes in labour supply will solely be a function of fertility. In different
extensions we analyse the impact of variations in labour supply due to changes in
the share of workers entering the R&D sector and in the retirement age, and due
to improvements in skill.
rented capital (Ki,t) and labour (Li,t). Therefore,
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
yi,t = ((Ki,t)
α(θtMi,t)
1−α)1−γIΥγIi,t for i ∈ At (the automated sector)
yi,t = ((Ki,t)
α(Li,t)
1−α)1−γIΥγIi,t for i ∈ Zt \ At (the labour-intensive sector).
(8)
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4To ensure robots are more productive than labour we set θ¯ such that Wt > qt/θt for all t. In an extension
we allow productivity of robots relative to labour to increase as automation rises (θt is a function of At).
2.3 Research and Development
R&D consists of the creation of goods (innovation), and the development of proce-
dures that allow robots to be introduced in the production process (automation).
Let Zpt be the stock of goods for innovator p, who at each period spends S
p
t and
employs labour (LI,p,t) to invent ϕt(Sp,t)
κRD(LI,p,t)
κL new goods, where κRD, κL ∈
The higher the real wage is relative to the price of robots, the larger is the profit
differential in favour of the automated sector.
Under this production structure, economic growth is the result of i) the rise in
the number of intermediate goods (Zt grows), and ii) the introduction of robots
that displace labour. These two forms of technological change come from R&D
investments, described next.
θt denotes the relative productivity of robots versus labour, and α, γI ∈ (0, 1) control
the capital and input shares. The rental rate of capital, net of depreciation, is
denoted rk,t − δ and the relative price of robots, qt. We initially set θt to be time
invariant, θt = θ¯.
4
Since capital and labour are complements, capital biased technological progress
may increase labour productivity and wages. On the contrary, robot biased tech-
nological progress (automation) substitutes workers, hence, it displaces labour and
decreases wages. In our view, this is a crucial difference between automation and
previous technological revolutions, which introduced new forms of capital that were
complementary to (some) labour inputs instead of a new form of capital (robots)
that replaces labour in the production process.
In this framework the ratio of profits (Πi,t) in the automated and labour-intensive
sector is given by
Πi∈At,t
Πi∈Zt\At,t
=
(
Wt
qt/θt
)(1−α)(1−γI)(ψ−1)
. (9)
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5Nt is included in the congestion factor since, as discussed in Jones (1995) and more recently Bloom et al.
(2017), models of endogenous growth where growing employment in R&D (due to population growth) generates
faster steady state output growth are inconsistent with the data.
Automation investors (q) spend Ξq,t and hire LA,q,t to transform a Z
q
t good into
a Aqt good, which then becomes part of the set of goods that can be produced by ro-
bots. This conversion process succeeds with probability λt = λ
(
(Zqt −Aqt )κRD+κL
Ψ˜
κRD
t N
κL
t
Ξq,A,t
)
,
with λ′(·) > 0 and Ξq,A,t = (Ξq,t)κRD(LA,q,t)κL . If unsuccessful, the good remains
in the labour-intensive sector. Once automation is successful the investor earns a
fraction ϑ of the profits of the robot-intensive intermediate producer. Thus, the
[0, 1] represents the relative weight of investment and labour for R&D. Thus, the
stock of goods Zpt+1 is
Zpt+1 = ϕt(Sp,t)
κRD(LI,p,t)
κL + φZpt , (10)
where φ is the intermediate good survival rate. Following Comin and Gertler (2006)
and Aksoy et al. (2019) we set ϕt ≡ χZt[Ψ˜ρ(St)κRD−ρ(Nt)κL ]−1. Since R&D pro-
ductivity depends on the aggregate stock of goods (Zt), there is a positive spillo-
ver as in Romer (1990). There is also a congestion externality via the factor
[Ψ˜ρ(St)
κRD−ρ(Nt)κL ].5 The R&D elasticity of new technology creation in equilibrium
is ρ.
Innovators borrow Spt from the financial intermediary. Upon creation of a new
good, they receive a fraction ϑ of the profits of the intermediate firm that produces it.
Thus, the value of an invented good is Jt = ϑΠi,t+(Rt+1)
−1φEtJt+1, for i ∈ Zt \At,
where Πi,t for i ∈ Zt \ At is the profit of the intermediate good firm. Innovator
p will then invest ISp,t = (Sp,t)
κRD(LI,p,t)
κL until the marginal cost equates the
expected gain. Defining τS,t as the shadow price of ISp,t, then Sp,t = ISp,tτS,tκRD,
LI,p,tWRD,t = ISp,tτS,tκL and φE[Jt+1] =
Rt+1τS,t
ϕt
. Using (10),
St = κRDR
−1
t+1φEtJt+1(Zt+1 − φZt). (11)
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6We assume that the elasticity of λt to changes in its input is constant and not greater than one, then we
define λ ≡ λ′λt
(Zqt−Aqt )κRD+κLΞq,A,t
Ψ˜
κRD
t N
κL
t
1
κRD
. See the Appendix for details.
7Aggregate investment in automation is Ξq,t(Zt −At) and since innovators are of measure 1, Sp,t = St.
mation is a negative function of az,t, the current level of the ratio of total number
of automated goods to the total number of goods. As innovation decreases and this
ratio increases, the pace of automation slows down. In this respect, automation is a
subsidiary activity of innovation; without innovation, automation cannot progress
indefinitely. Finally, innovators and automation investors compete for a limited
supply of labour and loans to fund their activities.
This R&D set-up features trade-offs between automation and innovation. First,
as the expected profits of firms in the automated sector increase relative to expected
profits in the labour-intensive sector (thus, the ratio Et[Jt+1/(Vt+1 − Jt+1)] falls),
automation investment increases relative to innovation investment. As the differen-
tial of profits is ultimately a function of factor prices, automation and innovation
respond to changes in wages and the price of robots. Second, investment in auto-
value of an automated good is Vt = ϑΠi,t+(Rt+1)
−1φEtVt+1, for i ∈ At. Automation
investors set investment and labour employed to maximise expected gains such that
Ξq,t = λλtR
−1
t φEt[Vt+1 − Jt+1], and LA,q,tWRD,t = Ξq,t
κL
κRD
. (12)
where λ is a function of the elasticity of λt to changes in its input.
6
Since the stock of labour intensive goods at t for which automation is feasible is
(Zqt − Aqt ), the flow of the stock of automated goods is given by
Aqt+1 = λtφ(Z
q
t − Aqt ) + φAqt . (13)
From (11) and (12) the ratio of aggregate investment in innovation and automa-
tion is7
St
Ξt
=
Et[φκRD(gZ,t+1 − φ)Jt+1]
Et[λ(az,t+1gZ,t+1 − az,tφ)(Vt+1 − Jt+1)] , where, g
Z
t+1 =
Zt+1
Zt
, az,t =
At
Zt
(14)
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2.6 Market Clearing and Equilibrium
The market clearing conditions are: Final Good: yt = Cw,t + Cr,t +
∫ Zt
0
Υi,tdi +
Ωt + It, Asset Flow Condition: Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + It, Credit Markets: Bt+1 =
St+Ξt, Capital Markets: Kt =
∫ Zt
0
Ki,tdi, Inputs: Υt =
∫ Zt
0
Υi,tdi, Robots Markets:
Mt =
∫ At
0
Mi,tdi, and Labour Markets: N
wR
t =
∫
q
LA,q,tdi +
∫
p
Li,p,tdi, and N
wL
t =∫ Zt\At
0
Li,tdi.
The equilibrium consists of tuples of endogenous predetermined variables {FAzt+1,
Kt+1, At+1, Zt+1, Bt+1} and of endogenous variables {Czt , Hwt , dzt , Dzt , NwRt , NwLt ,
yt, yi,t, yj,t, Mt, Ωt, St, Ξt, LA,t, St, LI,t, Vt, Jt, λt, Π
i
t, Π
j
t , Ct, r
k
t , Rt, Π
RD
t , Π
A
t , Wt,
WRD,t, Pi,t, Pj,t, qt, εt, ςt} for z = {w, r}, i ∈ At, j ∈ Zt \ At such that:
a.Workers and retirees maximise utility subject to their budget constraints; b. Inter-
mediate and final firms maximise profits; c. Profits are also maximised in innovation,
automation, and robot production ; d. The financial intermediary selects assets to
maximise profits, and its profits are shared amongst retirees and workers according
to their share of assets; and e. Consumption goods, capital, labour, robots, and
asset markets clear.
2.4 Robots Production
Robot producers invest Ωt final goods to produce Mt = Ω
η
t robots according to
max
Ω,t
ΠΩ,t = qtMt − Ωt s.t. Mt = Ωηt . (15)
where qt is the relative price charged to intermediate good producers for each robot.
2.5 Financial Intermediary
A zero expected profit financial intermediary allocates assets among the households,
and the production and R&D sectors and provides annuities to retirees. It sells as-
sets to the households (FAwt , FA
r
t ), owns capital (Kt) and rents it to firms and lends
funds (Bt+1) to innovators and automation investors to finance their expenditures
(St and Ξt, respectively). Finally, it owns R&D plants, robots and good producers
and receives their dividends.
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8We also verify the robustness of our results by setting Ψ˜t ≡ yt. Transition paths between BGP s are more
persistent but the results are qualitatively similar.
librate the incentive to automate with the incentive to create new tasks. However,
following this approach in our model would introduce a mechanism that directly off-
sets the demographic changes that alter labour supply, which is the main objective
of our analysis. In our setting, each agent is endowed with a normalised one unit of
effective labour supply (skill). In such an environment with a deterministic labour
supply responding to demographic changes, wages must vary to ensure the capital
output ratio is constant on a BGP . Thus, we need an alternative mechanism to
ensure output shares of labour-intensive and automated sectors do not diverge. The
We define a BGP as an equilibrium in which factor shares, (rkt + δ)Kt/yt, WtLt/yt
and qtMt/yt, and the interest rate, Rt, are constant, and consumption, Ct, and
capital stock, Kt, grow at the same rate as output, Yt.
First, to ensure that investment in innovation does not diverge, we use the current
value of automated goods as a scaling factor, so that Ψ˜t ≡ VtAt.8 Comin and Gertler
(2006), in a similar model in which the price of capital is determined at time t,
assume that Ψ˜t equals the value of the stock of capital, and, hence, Ψ˜t fluctuates
accordingly. Since in our model there is only one final good, the price of capital and
the value of the capital stock are constant at t, which invalidates the choice of the
value of the stock of capital as a scaling factor.
Second, in models with factor-augmenting technological progress, substitutabi-
lity between factors of production may prevent the economy from reaching a BGP
(see Acemog˘lu (2003)). As such, automation may generate an imbalance between
the labour and robot income shares. One option is to rely on wage adjustments to
correct for such imbalances, while the effective labour supply is allowed to change
to ensure that the capital output ratio is constant, as in Acemog˘lu and Restrepo
(2018b), where effective labour supply responds to wages and the return on capital
(Ls(W/RK)). In such a framework, there is flexibility for wages to adjust to equi-
3 Balanced Growth and Comparative Analysis
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pi,t
pt
=
ψ − 1
ψ
(rkt + δ)
α(1−γI)q(1−α)(1−γI)t
(α(1− γI))α(1−γI)γγII ((1− α)(1− γI))(1−α)(1−γI)
(16)
Therefore, on a BGP with constant interest rates, the growth rate of the price of
robots and of real wages must be equal (gq,t = gwg,t).
On a BGP , the labour income share
(
lst =
WtLt
yt
)
is constant. We assume each
agent is endowed with a (normalised) one unit of effective labour supply and thus
gL,t = Lt/Lt−1 = NwLt /N
wL
t−1 = gn,t. Therefore, gq,t = gwg,t =
(
gt
gn,t
)
Using the production function for robots and that inputs in robots production
over output Ωt/yt and robots income share
(
rst =
qtMt
yt
)
are constant on a BGP ,
the growth rate of the price of robots is such that gη−1t gq,t = 1
Combining these two conditions gives: gηt = gn,t.
pj,t
pt
=
ψ
ψ − 1
(rkt + δ)
α(1−γI)(Wt)(1−α)(1−γI)
(α(1− γI))α(1−γI)γγII ((1− α)(1− γI))(1−α)(1−γI)
(17)
introduction of a robot producing sector to determine the price of robots plays this
role, as shown in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Let gq,t ≡ qtqt−1 be the growth rate of the relative price of robots,
gwg,t ≡ WtWt−1 be the growth rate of the real wage in production, gt ≡
yt
yt−1
, the growth
rate of output, gn,t, the population growth and g
Z
t ≡ ZtZt−1 , gAt ≡ AtAt−1 , the growth
rates of varieties Zt and At, respectively. Then, with robots production given by
Mt = Ω
η
t , for⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
η < 1, there exists a BGP where (gt)
η−1gq,t = 1, gq,t =
gt
gn,t
> 1
and gZt = g
A
t = (gt)
(1−η)(ψ−1)(1−α)(1−γI) > 1
η = 1, there exists a BGP where gt = gn,t and g
Z
t = g
A
t = 1
Proof
As the final good aggregates all varieties, with a constant elasticity of substitution
(see equation (7)), the relative prices (pi,t/pt), for automated goods (i ∈ At), and
(pj,t/pt), for labour-intensive goods (j ∈ Zt \ At) must grow at the same rate in
a BGP to ensure output shares in the automated sector (
∫
i∈At pi,tyi,tdi/ptyt) and
labour-intensive sector (
∫
j∈Zt\At pj,tyj,tdj/ptyt) do not diverge. Given the production
functions for each sector (8), the relative prices are given by
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If η < 1 then as gn,t > 1, it follows that gq,t > 1 and gt > gn,t. Hence, at the
equilibrium with constant factor shares, output growth is greater than population
growth. If η = 1 then gAt = 1 and gt = gn,t. The BGP in this case has no
technological progress.
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. When η < 1, increases in
the stock of produced robots Mt require greater investment. Thus, as the economy
grows and robots become more abundant, it becomes relatively harder to transform a
complex final good into robots, so that the marginal profitability of robot production
falls and the differential in output shares between the labour-intensive and the
automated sectors does not increase. As a result, the labour and robot income
9We extend the model to relax the assumption that robots fully depreciate in one period. Transitions between
BGP s are affected, but the restriction on η to ensure a BGP exists remains the same: BGP is still characterised
by gηt = gn,t. Details of this extension are presented in the Appendix.
shares do not diverge in the long run. Therefore, holding wages constant, for robots
to become more abundant than labour their relative price with respect to the final
good must decrease. Eventually, as robots are extensively used in production to
the detriment of labour, such price decreases are no longer feasible, preventing the
economy from reaching an equilibrium where only robots are used in production.9
Alternatively, were η > 1 an equilibrium with constant shares would necessarily
imply gAt < 1, the number of goods with automated production would asympto-
tically approach zero, and gt < gn,t, with the innovation rate being smaller than
the good’s survival rate. When the economy grows faster than population, costs in
Finally, from the final good production function we obtain that demand for
automated goods is given by yi,t =
(
pi,t
pt
)−ψ
yt. As all automated firms are identical,
summing up across i, and as ym,t ≡
∫
i∈At pi,tyi,tdi/ptyt and interest rate are constant,
we obtain that on a BGP
gAt =
(
ym,t
ym,t−1
)(1+(1−η)(ψ−1)(1−α)(1−γI))( rkt − δ
rkt−1 − δ
)α(1−γI)(ψ−1)
(gt)
(1−η)(ψ−1)(1−α)(1−γI)
= (gt)
(1−η)(ψ−1)(1−α)(1−γI)
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10Aghion et al. (2017) discuss different alternatives to prevent singularities. In one of the cases, which they
frame as a form of Baumol’s cost disease, this is achieved by restricting the productivity gain of some tasks in
the labour-intensive sector (relative to the automated sector) increase. With η > 1
a higher output in the automated sector requires a relatively smaller increase in
investment (Ωt), boosting the relative size of the robots-intensive sector. Hence, to
ensure that in equilibrium ym,t
ym,t−1
= 1, the number of automated goods must shrink,
restricting the growth of robots to be consistent with constant factor shares. In this
scenario, the price of robots (qt) asymptotically converges to zero.
In sum, to avoid a labour-free singularity we restrict the efficiency gains in the
transformation of final goods into robots. On a BGP the final good embeds an
increasing set of intermediate goods, some produced employing the less efficient
factor — labour. It is reasonable to assume that robots that are capable of replacing
labour in production would also eventually increase in complexity to reflect the
level of economic development. Robots production with η < 1 reproduces such an
environment by requiring that as the number of varieties and output increase, the
transformation of the final good into robots does not become more efficient. This is
similar to Aghion et al. (2017), who introduce a ‘bottleneck’ to prevent a singularity
by restricting the productivity gain of an essential input, sustaining its relative price
in terms of the final good.10
We now explore the implications of Proposition 1 to comparative analysis across
BGP s, restricting the focus to BGP s with technological progress where η < 1.
Corollary 1. Technological progress on theBGP is given by gZt = χ
(
St
Ψ˜t
)ρ
(Li,t/Nt)
κL
+φ = (gn,t)
(1−η)(ψ−1)(1−α)(1−γI)(1/η) = gAt . As gn,t is exogenous, changes in the effi-
ciency in innovation investment χ only affect economic growth in the short term.
As the efficiency of innovation investment (χ) increases, Z grows faster, and
both the share of output produced with labour and wages increase. Higher wages
lead to a fall in the relative profitability in the labour-intensive sector, increasing
the incentives to automate. That diverts resources from innovation and as such,
investment in new product creation (St) and labour employed in innovation (Li,t)
a production framework where tasks are complementary. Thus, as income/output increases, the relative price
of these tasks are sustained.
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presence of total factor productivity gains.13 In contrast to the neoclassical growth
model in Uzawa (1961), here technological growth is endogenous and is a function of
the incentive to create new goods (Z). As automation and innovation are matched
on a BGP and because of the assumption that newly created goods can only be
produced with labour, technological gain is directly linked with the profitability in
the labour-intensive sector, and ultimately, the labour market restrictions imposed
by population growth end up determining the pace of technological growth and
per capita growth. Confirming the insights from Grossman et al. (2017), who look
at potential ways to offset the restrictions identified by Uzawa (1961) and Jones
and Scrimgeour (2005) on balanced growth in neoclassical growth models, when
13On a BGP , the capital/robots ratio is a constant linear function of the capital/labour ratio. The assumption
of Cobb-Douglas production functions in both labour and robots intensive sectors ensures the existence of a
BGP in which total factor technical change can be represented as labour-augmenting.(see Jones and Scrimgeour
(2005)).
11The quantitative analysis of this transition, using the calibrated model, is shown in the appendix.
12In the model with demographic changes and innovation investment without automation developed in Aksoy
et al. (2019) this trade-off is not present and an increase in χ leads to higher growth in the long run.
fall, reducing gZt back to its initial position.
11 Thus, an increase in χ has only a
temporary effect on growth. Automation, however, increases in the long run; with
the resources diverted towards automation, the economy can sustain a higher degree
of automation on a BGP . Therefore, the key driver of this result is the trade-off
between innovation and automation. 12
Corollary 2. Starting from an initial BGP equilibrium with technological pro-
gress, where gηt = gn,t and η < 1, if population growth falls, then the new BGP is
characterised by lower per-capita output growth.
A lower growth of labour supply directly leads to lower output growth as it
reduces one of the production’s inputs. Moreover, it also reduces the incentives to
innovate. This additional mechanism lowers output growth further such that output
per capita growth on the new BGP falls. Since on a BGP the growth of factor prices
equalise and robots and labour eventually grow at the same pace, the aggregate
production function net of intermediate inputs (Υt) can be represented as a function
of the level of capital/labour ratio or of the level of capital/output ratio as in Uzawa
(1961) and Jones and Scrimgeour (2005). Therefore, balanced growth emerges in the
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we relax the assumption of constant labour skill and allow endogenous changes to
skill/effective labour supply in section 5.3, output growth is no longer a function of
population growth only.
Next we focus on the effects of demographic changes on automation (az,t =
At/Zt) and on the labour share (lst) on BGP s. Before stating the results, we make
two assumptions.14 First, (A1) we impose a upper bound on the level of automation
on the BGP by setting az  ρφλ . The stock of goods for which automation is feasible
is Zt − At. As az increases, this stock falls. Given the survival rate of varieties
φ, investment in automation and innovation may then be implausibly high such
that a high degree of automation is maintained on a BGP . We therefore limit
the initial level of automation to discard equilibria with such implausible levels of
R&D investment. Second, (A2) we assume ψ > 1 + 1
(1−η)(1−α)(1−γI) to restrict the
firms’ mark-ups such that an increase of one percent in the growth of varieties does
not generate a more than 1% increase in output growth (recall that on the BGP ,
gZt = g
A
t = (gt)
(1−η)(ψ−1)(1−α)(1−γI)). If (A2) does not hold, an equilibrium with a
14Both assumptions are sufficient but not necessary for propositions 2 and 3 to hold. Proofs of both proposi-
tions are shown in the Appendix.
daz
az
=
− 1
η
(
d1
κRD
κL
Γ2 +
ρ
κL
Γ1d2
)
dgn
gn
−
(
d1
κRD
κL
+ ρ
κL
d2
)
dR
R
c2d1 − d2c1 (18)
dls
ls
= (1− yL)
1
η
(
c1
κRD
κL
Γ2 +
ρ
κL
Γ1c2
)
dgn
gn
+
(
c1
κRD
κL
+ ρ
κL
c2
)
dR
R
c2d1 − d2c1 (19)
positive rate of output growth would also imply the number of varieties shrinks with
time. Under our calibration (A1) restricts the degree of automation such that no
more than 75% of the existing varieties are produced in the automated sector, and
(A2) restricts the intermediate good firms’ mark-up to be smaller than 23%.
Proposition 2. Starting from a BGP , when population growth falls, the economy
converges to a new BGP in which, when interest rates are lower, the degree of
automation is higher and the labour income share is lower. The changes in the
degree of automation and in the labour income share are respectively given by
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equilibrium interest rate. A fall in the interest rate boosts greater investments in
innovation and automation. However, as labour supply growth falls, relative costs
in the labour-intensive sector increase, giving incentives for R&D investment to be
diverted to automation, which leads to a decrease in the labour share. In the case
of ageing, the direct effect of labour supply lead to a fall of both innovation and
automation.
We find that the positive productivity effects of the increase in automation are
not able to fully compensate for the effects of the fall in labour supply growth once
the economy converges to the new BGP . Acemog˘lu and Restrepo (2018b) highlight
a long-run productivity effect occurring when the pace of automation increases.
As the economy converges back to a new BGP , the return on capital (interest
rate), which initially increased together with automation, must fall back. As a
result, capital accumulates with the gains accruing to the relatively inelastic factor,
namely, labour. In our model, capital is complementary to labour and robots. Thus,
where yL ≡
(∫
i∈Z\A piyidi
)
/py is the share of output produced using labour, and c1,
c2, d1, d2 > 0 are functions of the initial BGP . If A1 holds then c2d1 − d2c1 > 0
and if A2 holds then parameters Γ1, Γ2 > 0.
Proposition 3. Starting from a BGP , the changes in the degree of automation and
in the labour income share due to population ageing are respectively given by
daz
az
=
dRDpop
RDpop
(d1 + d2)−
(
d1
κRD
κL
+ ρ
κL
d2
)
dR
R
c2d1 − d2c1 (20)
where RDpop = N
wRD
N
is the share of R&D workers in the population and c1, c2,
d1, d2 > 0. Thus, the lower the weight of labour on R&D activity (κL) is, the more
likely it is that the BGP of a more aged economy, in which interest rates are smaller,
is characterised by a higher degree of automation and a lower labour income share.
In both cases, automation and the labour income share on the new BGPs are
directly affected, due to labour supply effects, and indirectly, due to changes in the
dls
ls
= (1− yL)
−
(
dRDpop
RDpop
(c1 + c2)−
(
c1
κRD
κL
+ ρ
κL
c2
)
dR
R
)
c2d1 − d2c1 (21)
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15Adding an explicit capital deepening effect as a result of automation in the long run as in Acemog˘lu and
Restrepo (2018b) could further offset the negative effect of lower labour supply growth. Berg et al. (2018),
employing a neoclassical growth model with robots, argue automation leads to higher growth and inequality.
Technology in their model is exogenous thus the innovation and automation trade-off is not present.
4.1 Calibration
One period of the model corresponds to one year. Workers are defined as 20 to
65 years old individuals and retirees are defined as individuals above 65 years old.
The parameters controlling the law of motion of population are calibrated to match
the average share of workers and retirees in total population in 1993 in the US,
and the number of working years the individual may live before retiring (45 years).
This procedure delivers a birth rate of ωy = 0.0265, a probability of retirement of
1 − ωw = 0.022, and a death probability of 1 − ωr = 0.07. The same procedure is
applied using data from Europe.
The share of workers in innovation (SwRD) is set to match the share of R&D
workers in US population, and dropRD is set to make the average age of R&D workers
to be 40 (slightly lower than the average age of employed scientists reported in the
Survey of Doctorate Recipients (SDR) of the National Science Foundation - 2013).
For the R&D parameters, we closely follow Comin and Gertler (2006). Obso-
lescence (φ) and productivity in innovation (χ) are set so that growth of GDP per
although capital accumulation also occurs after an ageing shock, the main driver is
the saving effect due to the fall in marginal propensity to consume of households
approaching retirement. In our setting, automation increases while interest rate
falls and capital accumulation increases, in line with empirical evidence.15
4 Demographic Transition and Growth in Europe
and in the US
In this section we focus on transition dynamics, analysing the consequences of de-
mographic changes over the next decades predicted for the US and for Core Europe
(defined as the aggregation of Germany, France, Italy and Spain). Before presenting
the numerical results we briefly describe the choices of the parameter values.
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working age person is 0.016 (as in the US from 1970 onwards) and the share of inno-
vation expenditures in total GDP is 0.012. The mark-up for intermediate goods is
15%. The elasticity of intermediate goods with respect to R&D (ρ) is 0.9. The rate
of automation is set to λ = 0.1. The elasticity of this rate to increasing intensity
(λ) is set to 1. Finally we set κRD = 1.
Regarding the link between demographics and innovation, which depends on the
elasticity of invention to employed workers in R&D (κL), we follow Aksoy et al.
(2019) who, reflecting the productivity of ideas of agents of different ages in Jones
(2010), set κL = 0.5.
Finally we set the macro parameters in line with Comin and Gertler (2006). The
discount factor β= 0.96; the capital share α = 0.33; the yearly depreciation rate
δ = 0.08; and the share of intermediate goods γI = 0.5. Following Gertler (1999)
we set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1/(1− υ)) = 0.25. Given output
16Tables listing all parameter values are in the Appendix.
4.2 Quantitative Results
The initial steady state is set with a stationary population distribution, represented
by fertility and survival probability rates, that match the population shares of wor-
kers (age 20-65) and retirees (age above 65) in 1993 for the US and Core Europe.
We then use the same population shares from the United Nations (2016) projection
data for 2055 for each region, to obtain the new fertility and survival probability
rates that describe the final stationary population distribution (all demographic va-
riables are shown in the Appendix). The demographic transition is then defined as
the path of these two demographic parameters from 1993 until 2055. From 2055
onwards demographic variables no longer change and the economy slowly converges
to a new BGP . As our interest is on the medium-run effects of this demographic
transition we focus on the variation of economic variables produced by the demo-
and population growth and (gt)
η−1(gt/gn,t) = 1, we obtain η = 0.15.16
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Note: The figure plots the effects of the projected demographic changes in each region. For Per Capita
Output growth = (yt/yt−1)(Nt−1/Nt), Share of Workers in Population - Nwt /Nt and Growth Rate
of real wage - Wt/Wt−1 we show the Change relative to the initial BGP . For Share of Automated
Sector - ym,t, Labour Share of Output WtLt/yt, Rt - Real Interest Rate and Consumption - Ct/yt
we show the percentage change relative to the initial BGP . For the price of robots we show the ratio
of price of robots during the transition and on the BGP - qt/qBGP .
Figure 1: Demographic Transition: United States and Europe
graphic changes from 2000 up to 2040 (Figure 1), discarding the first seven years to
decrease the dependence of the simulation to the initial steady state.17
When mortality decreases, savings increase and the interest rate falls, as in
Aksoy et al. (2019) and Eggertsson et al. (2019). Hence, there are more resources
for innovation, automation, and capital investments. As fertility decreases, the
new cohort of workers entering in the labour market also decreases, pushing wages
up. Higher wages depress the profitability of the labour-intensive sector, boosting
automation. As robots are more productive than labour, productivity rises. Both of
these mechanisms lead to an increase in output growth.18 However, as the profits of
the labour-intensive sector fall, the investment in innovation decreases. Moreover, a
drop in fertility implies that the pool of workers available for innovation decreases.19
17Our results are not dependent on the years selected to calibrate the demographic variables. See the Appendix
for alternative simulations.
18The change in the growth rate from 1993 till 2000 is positive, we show results from 2000 in figure 1.
19Using a cross-section data on patents and demographics, Acemog˘lu and Restrepo (2018a) document an
increase in the number of patents related to robots and a decrease in those related to computer, software,
nanotechnology and pharmaceutics due to demographics, supporting the trade-off between innovation and au-
tomation present in our model.
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20Gordon (2012) includes demographic changes as one of the “headwinds” preventing economic growth. Aksoy
et al. (2019) estimate that from 2000 till 2015, population changes have lead to a reduction in output growth in
the US of around 0.5 percentage points. The link between demographics and innovation is behind this negative
effect. In a similar projection exercise, they report that demographic changes in the next decades lead to a more
sizeable reduction in output than the results reported here. The key distinction of our analysis is the inclusion
of automation, which has a positive offsetting effect on growth. Nonetheless, both studies give support to the
“headwind” effect of demographics on growth.
As the growth of new goods Zt decreases, overall growth is reduced, hampering the
pace of automation in the future and, ultimately, delivering lower per capita growth.
Thus, the initial effect of higher savings and lower interest rates wears off, and the
reduction in invention of new differentiated goods outweighs the productivity gains
from automation.20
The share of workers in Core Europe decreases faster (since fertility is conside-
rably lower in Europe), boosting automation more than in the US. This result is
consistent with the data. From 2000 to 2015, automation, measured as the stock of
robots by thousand employees, increased from 1.55 to 2.7 in the four core European
countries, with an increase from 2.28 to 4.24 in Germany, 0.79 to 1.6 in Spain, 0.81
to 1.17 in France, and from 1.7 to 2.5 in Italy, while in the US it increased from
0.64 to 1.55 (International Federation of Robotics (2017)).
Graetz and Michaels (2018) show that during1990-2005 the price of robots fell
by roughly 20% on average across developed countries. In our set-up, on a BGP the
price of robots q must be increasing, ensuring it does not diverge from the growing
real wages. However, during the demographic transition, as the degree of automa-
tion increases, the growth of the price of robots falls. Figure 1 depicts the price of
robots, q, relative to its BGP path. By 2030, q would be 10% lower due to demo-
graphic changes. A more substantial fall would require the framework to account
also for technological progress that increases the efficiency in robot production (see
section 5.2).
Despite the initial increase in wages, as the economy becomes more automated,
eventually the labour share of income decreases by around 0.6 percent from 2000
to 2020, due to both a fall in wages and employment. Karabarbounis and Neiman
(2014) show that from 2000 to 2015 the global labour income share fell around 4
percent (roughly from 0.615 to 0.59). The labour share has different drivers: price
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21Bergholt et al. (2019) also provide evidence that automation, or technological progress that leads to the
substitution of labour by capital, may be behind the fall in labour income shares.
We considering four extensions. The first two focus on labour market configurations.
First, we allow new workers with idiosyncratic inherited talent to select to which
sector they will supply labour (Labour Choice). Once this decision is taken, workers
drop from the R&D sector and cannot re-join during their working lives as in the
benchmark case. Thus, the share of new workers that join the R&D sector, SwRD,
is a function of the wage differential between the R&D and the production sectors
(WRDt /Wt). Second, we analyse the effects of delaying the retirement age (Late
Retirement). We alter the retirement age to keep the ratio between the durations
of working life and of retirement approximately constant.22
As for the role of robots in production and innovation, we first consider that
robots could also be used to innovate and automate (Robots in R&D), so that as
the economy becomes more automated (az,t increases), robots replace a larger share
of labour in R&D.23 This specification resembles the artificial intelligence model of
Aghion et al. (2017), but restricting efficiency gains in robots production to ensure
the economy converges to a BGP . Second, we also consider the possibility (Robots
22Details on the extensions are in the Appendix. Under the UN projections, in the US life expectancy will
increase by 12,7 years from 1993 to 2055. Thus, we simulate the effects of rising retirement age by 8 years,
roughly two thirds of the increase in life expectancy.
23In this case, investment in innovation and automation are now, respectively, ISt = (Sp,t)
κRD ((1−az,t)LξLMI,t +
az,tM
ξLM
I,t )
κL/ξLM and ΞA,t = (Ξq,t)
κRD ((1−az,t)LξLMA,t +az,tM ξLMA,t )κL/ξLM , whereMI,t andMA,t are robots used
in R&D, produced by a similar robot production sector as in the benchmark model, and ξLM is the elasticity
of substitution of robots and labour.
5.1 Alternative labour market and robot configurations
of capital, changes in goods and labour market structures, and automation, which
we show are influenced by demographic changes.21
5 Extensions
In an attempt to account for different ways in which labour markets and technologi-
cal progress may evolve, we start this section by modifying labour markets and the
integration of robots in economic activity. We then look at a case where the price
of robots fall substantially during the transition and finally consider endogenous
changes in labour skills.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 30 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2004
24Note that, in the Robots Productivity case if ηˆ < 1 then a fall in population growth continues to lead to a
fall in output per capita for any value of μ > 0 (thus, in general, the result in Corollary 2 remains valid for this
extension as well).
25A caveat is in order: as Bloom et al. (2017) show, despite a sharp increase in labour employed in R&D,
the production of new ideas is fairly constant; in their conclusion new ideas seem to be harder to find. If that
is indeed the case migration of workers towards R&D might be less effective in dampening the effects of the
demographic transition.
Productivity) that the relative productivity of robots, instead of being constant,
rises as the automated sector grows (θt = θ¯A
μ
t , μ = 0.05).
We first focus on the long-run output growth comparison across extensions with
the following proposition (the proof is shown in the Appendix).
Proposition 4. After the demographic transition, the long-run effect on output
growth is the same in all four extensions as in the benchmark model.
In the three extensions, Labour Choice, Late Retirement and Robots in R&D the
BGP , as in the benchmark case, is characterised by gt = g
1
η
n,t. The conditions that
determine relative prices, labour supply growth and the price of robots in the robots
production sector are unchanged. Across these cases, η is the same as in the bench-
the lack of substitutes, do not fall and thus SwRD increases. Labour employed in
automation and innovation increase, with the former increasing more. The trade-off
between innovation and automation is still present, but is less pronounced as the
economy diverts its labour resources towards R&D.25 Delaying the retirement age
ic
mark model.
In the case the relative productivity of robots rises as the automated sector grows
(Robots Productivity) the BGP is characterised by gt = g
1+μ(ψ−1)(1−α)(1−γI )
ηˆ+μ(ψ−1)(1−α)(1−γI )
n,t , given
that the conditions that determine relative prices are altered. As the initial BGP in
this extension has the same level of output and population growth as in the bench-
mark economy, ηˆ is set such that ηBenchmark =
1+μ(ψ−1)(1−α)(1−γI)
ηˆ+μ(ψ−1)(1−α)(1−γI) , thus the effect of
changes in gn,t on gt remains the same.
24
We now look at the effects of the demographic transition in the medium-run
for the US under these alternative specifications. Results are shown in Figure 2.
Allowing new workers to migrate to the R&D sector offsets the negative effects
of the demographic transition on growth during the transition. As automation
p inks up, the wage the production sector falls. Wages in the R&D sector, given
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In both extensions that alter the way robots are integrated the negative effects of
26We do not explore whether the age structure within the working population has an effect on automation.
If older workers are more/less replaceable relative to their younger counterparts our results may be altered. On
this, see Acemog˘lu and Restrepo (2018a).
lower population growth on GDP per capita growth and on consumption during the
transition are of smaller magnitude than in the benchmark model. As intermediate
inputs are used in production, higher robot productivity increases total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP ), generating positive spillovers on the labour-intensive sector. That
partially offsets the negative impact of lower labour supply, reducing the incentive
to divert resources from innovation such that the share of the automated sector is
not as large as in the benchmark case. When robots are used in R&D, the negative
effects of resource reallocation on innovation are mitigated and thus automation
increases more significantly.
Note: The figure plots the effects of the projected demographic changes under different specifications.
For Per Capita Output growth = (yt/yt−1)(Nt−1/Nt) we show the Change relative to the initial
BGP . For Share of Automated Sector - ym,t and Consumption - Ct/yt we show the percentage
change relative to the initial BGP .
Figure 2: Demographic Transition: Alternative Scenarios
obviously delivers a lower fall in the share of workers to total population and, thus,
the incentives to automate are lower. Although delaying retirement slows down the
fall in working age population, it cannot avoid the negative impact of population
ageing on innovation activity (less young workers involved in the creation of new
goods depresses innovation). In this case, since automation eventually falls on the
new BGP , wage growth is sustained and the labour share is higher.26
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Setting the income per capita equal across all scenarios in 2000, we find that
the income per capita in 2040 would be around 15% lower in the benchmark model
than in the two best case scenarios, when labour migrates towards the R&D sector
(Labour Choice) and when the retirement age is delayed (Late Retirement). Thus,
achieving a smoother transition towards the new BGP may generate significant
gains. Finally, extending the retirement age decreases the pace of automation and
increases the share of income of older workers, who are most likely employed in
the production sector. With the transition of young workers towards R&D, older
workers are more significantly negatively affected while most benefits accrue to
R&D workers. In sum, although in the long run per capita output growth converges
27The production of robots is given by Mt = Ω
η
t . We allow  to increase as automation increases. Eventually
it converges to a constant. As output and investment Ωt are growing this scenario is analogous to when η > 1.
to the same level, these extensions mitigate the effect of demographics during the
transition and impact automation and the shares of output assigned to labour and
robots in the long run.
5.2 Divergence and Robocalypse
Conceivably, robots could be produced more efficiently as the economy becomes
more automated. We incorporate this possibility by allowing TFP in the robots
production sector to increase in the medium run.27 Eventually (after more than 150
years in our simulation) TFP in robots production converges to a constant, so that
in this scenario the efficiency restriction that ensures BGP convergence is in effect
only in the long run.
Results are displayed in Figure 3. As demographics trigger automation, robots
are produced more cheaply, further raising the incentives to automate (from 2000
until 2020 the price of robots, q, falls by 40%). As TFP increases together with
the ratio az,t = (At/Zt), most of the output is produced by the automated sector.
Eventually, as innovation investment is compromised, output growth is negatively
affected despite the efficiency gains in the production of robots. Thus, if robots
are produced more efficiently but cannot invent new varieties, then a demographic
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“robocalypse scenario”, resembling the immiseration equilibrium of Benzell et al.
(2015), may arise. This conclusion is also robust to the case when both TFP of
robots production and productivity of robots in good’s production (θt) increase
during the transition (Robocalypse with Robots Productivity).
5.3 Labour Skill Improvements
One of the key features of the benchmark economy is that individuals are endowed
with constant effective labour supply (skill). Even with skill upgrading, insofar as it
is exogenously given, results will not qualitatively differ. For instance, assume the
effective labour supply is given by HtN
wL
t =
∫ Zt\At
0
Li,tdi. Then g
η
t = gL,t = gn,tgH,t,
where gH,t ≡ HtHt−1 . As long as gH,t is exogenous and gZt > 1, and thus η < 1, the
comparative analyses derived from the benchmark model are unchanged. 28
However, if the growth of effective labour depends on either automation or ca-
pital accumulation, then the effects of demographic changes may be very different.
We consider two cases. In the first, Automation-Skill, we set gH,t ≡ (gH)(az,t)μa ,
which implies that as the production in the labour-intensive sector becomes more
specialised in a smaller subset of the current set of varieties, as a result of greater
28This is consistent with the findings of Grossman et al. (2017) on the conditions under which human capital
accumulation alters the restrictions on technological progress under balanced growth.
Note: The figure plots the effects of the projected demographic changes under different specifications.
For Per Capita Output growth = (yt/yt−1)(Nt−1/Nt) and Robots TFP - t/t−1 we show the
Change relative to the initial BGP . For Share of Automated Sector - ym,t and Labour Share of
Output (WtLt)/yt we show the percentage change relative to the initial BGP .
Figure 3: Demographics and Robocalypse
only fails to increase output growth but atthat generates automation notransition
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automation, labour skills grow faster. In the second case, Capital-Skill, we as-
sume skills grow faster as the capital/output ratio increases, reflecting some form
of economy-wide capital-skill complementarity (see Grossman et al. (2017)). In this
case we set gH,t ≡ (gH)
(
Kt
yt
)μK
. μa and μK control the intensity of the complemen-
tarity between labour skills and automation and capital deepening, respectively.
In figure 4, we show the implications of demographic changes when effective
labour supply is endogenous, increasing with the degree of automation or capital
deepening. We reset gH such that in all specifications gH,0 = 1 and the initial
29To highlight that these extensions affect output growth also in the long run we show the transition for 80
years.
Note: The figure plots the effects of the projected demographic changes under different specifications.
For Per Capita Output growth = (yt/yt−1)(Nt−1/Nt) we show the Change relative to the initial
BGP . For Share of Automated Sector - ym,t and Consumption - Ct/yt we show the percentage
change relative to the initial BGP .
BGP is the same as in the benchmark case.29 Higher skill levels may offset the
negative effect of lower fertility on total labour supply, and, ultimately, on wages.
In the case of complementarity with automation, for high levels of μa, wages do
not respond to the demographic change as much and the incentive to automate
is significantly weakened. In the case of capital-skill complementarity, as ageing
leads to a significant fall in interest rates, the capital stock increases substantially
during the demographic transition. As a result, skill growth may be substantial,
fully compensating for the fall in the number of workers such that automation ends
up falling as a result of demographic changes. Only in this extreme scenario, growth
per capita in the long run is not negatively affected.
Figure 4: Demographics and Effective Labour Supply
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the incentives to innovate. Since on a BGP automation and innovation gains are
eventually matched, the creation of varieties through innovation is the main driver
6 Conclusion
Demographic changes are bound to shape the macroeconomic landscape of the next
decades. Population ageing may affect the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal
policies (Eggertsson et al. (2019) and Basso and Rachedi (2018)). In the medium
run demographic changes may restrain economic growth (Aksoy et al. (2019)) and
promote automation (Acemog˘lu and Restrepo (2018a)).
We have analysed the main interactions between demographics and technology
and their implications for economic growth. In our analysis we stress the impor-
tance of considering the trade-offs between the generation of new goods and the
automation of the production of existing ones while studying the consequences of
population ageing for R&D.
While keeping complementarities among inputs (intermediate goods, capital, and
either labour and robots), we put at the front of our analysis the labour displace-
ment effect of automation, and leave the creation of new job opportunities (the
reinstatement effect of technological changes) only to innovation. This may be an
of growth. Consequently, a rise in η ultimately leads to lower growth in the long
run. Allowing for higher automation or capital deepening to trigger higher levels
of effective labour supply may offset this negative effect, mitigating the trade-off
between innovation and automation and delivering higher per capita growth as η
increases (in the appendix we show the effect of a shock to η in the benchmark
model and in the model with skill complementarity).
Finally, one of the features of the benchmark economy is that an increase in
η, such that higher investment in robots production does not suffer from the same
degree of scaling inefficiencies as before, leads to a fall in growth per capita. The
main reason is that as η increases, despite the initial positive effect on growth,
automationthe price of robots relative to wages , promoting decreasingandfalls
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extreme case but still a good starting point for the analysis of the consequences of
demographic and technological changes.
Admittedly, it may be too early to conjecture how the new developments from
robotics and artificial intelligence will change the production of goods and R&D.
Thus, we consider several alternative specifications of how innovation and auto-
mation come about. The main conclusion is that, even though lower population
growth and population ageing increase automation and, initially, raise productivity
growth, in the medium run they are detrimental to economic growth. When using
population forecasts for US and Europe, the model predicts a fall in output per
capita growth, an increase in automation, and a fall in the labour income share
and in interest rates, reinforcing the economic trends already observed in the last
decades. Finally, our model indicates that instead of relying on machines, increases
in effective labour supply may be the force that offsets the impact of ageing and
lower fertility.
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Appendix - “From Secular Stagnation to
Robocalypse? Implications of Demographic and
Technological Changes”
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Appendix A. Equilibrium Conditions
We start by looking at the final and intermediate producers.
Goods Production Sector
Intermediate good firms j ∈ At select capital, robots and inputs to minimise
total costs, TC = ptqtM
j
t + (r
k
t + δ)K
j
t + PtΥ
j
t given a level of production Y
j
t =[
(Kjt )
α(θtM
j
t )
(1−α)](1−γI) [Υjt]γI . Let νjt be the real marginal cost for firm j. Then
νjt =
(rkt + δ)
α(1−γI)q(1−α)(1−γI)t
(α(1− γI))α(1−γI)γγII ((1− α)(1− γI))(1−α)(1−γI)
(A.1)
Kjt = ν
j
t
α(1− γI)
(rkt + δ)
yj,t (A.2)
Υjt = ν
j
t γIyj,t (A.3)
M jt = ν
j
t
(1− α)(1− γI)
qt
yj,tθt (A.4)
And given the final good production function,
pj,t
pt
=
ψ − 1
ψ
νjt (A.5)
yj,t =
(
pj,t
pt
)ψ
yt (A.6)
Πjt =
[
pj,t
pt
− νjt
]
yj,t =
1
ψ − 1ν
j
t yj,t (A.7)
Intermediate good firms i ∈ Zt \ At select capital, labour and inputs to minimise
total costs, TC = WtL
i
t + (r
k
t + δ)K
i
t + PtΥ
i
t given a level of production Y
i
t =[
(Kit)
α(Lit)
(1−α)](1−γI) [Υit]γI . Let νit be the real marginal cost for firm i. Then
νit =
(rkt + δ)
α(1−γI)(Wt)(1−α)(1−γI)
(α(1− γI))α(1−γI)γγII ((1− α)(1− γI))(1−α)(1−γI)
(A.8)
Kit = ν
i
t
α(1− γI)
(rkt + δ)
yi,t (A.9)
Υit = ν
i
tγIyi,t (A.10)
Lit = ν
i
t
(1− α)(1− γI)
(Wt)
yi,t (A.11)
And given the final good production function,
pi,t
pt
=
ψ
ψ − 1ν
i
t (A.12)
yi,t =
(
pi,t
pt
)ψ
yt (A.13)
Πit =
[
pi,t
pt
− νit
]
yi,t =
1
ψ − 1ν
i
tyi,t (A.14)
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Thus,
(Zqt − Aqt )κRD+κL
Ψ˜κRDt N
κL
t
λ′R−1t φ[Vt+1 − Jt+1] = 1 (A.23)
Assuming the elasticity of λt to changes in its input (denoted ˜λ ) is constant and
smaller than one, we define λ =
λ′
λt
(Zqt −Aqt )κRD+κLΞq,A,t
Ψ˜
κRD
t N
κL
t
1
κRD
= ˜λ
κRD
, then we obtain30
Ξt = λλtR
−1
t φ[Vt+1 − Jt+1](Zt − At) (A.24)
LA,tWRD,t = Ξt
κL
κRD
(A.25)
30We aggregate across automation investors to obtain Ξt = Xq,t(Zt − At) and LA,t = LA,q,t(Zt − At). Also
note that ˜λ = λκRD  1. We use this result in the proof of proposition 3 and 4.
Innovation Process
One can easily determine the flow of the stock of goods (Zt) and goods for which
robots can be employed in the production process (At), which are given by
Zt+1
Zt
= χ
(
St
Ψ˜t
)ρ
(LI,t/Nt)
κL + φ, and (A.18)
At+1
At
= λ
(
(Zt − At)κRD+κL(Ξt)κRD(LA,t)κL
Ψ˜κRDt N
κL
t
)
φ[Zt/At − 1] + φ (A.19)
Investment in R&D (St) and labour demand in product creation is determined by
(11) which using (10) becomes
St = κRDR
−1
t+1φEtJt+1(Zt+1 − φZt). (A.20)
LI,tWRD,t =
StκL
κRD
(A.21)
Profits are given by the total gain in seeling the right to goods invented as a result
of the previous period investment St−1 to adopters minus the cost of borrowing for
that investment. Thus,
ΠRD,t = ϑ
∫
i∈Zt\At
Πitdi− St−1Rt − LI,tWRD,t
Let τA,t be the shadow price of Ξq,A,t, then automation investors solve
max
Ξq,A,t,Ξq,t,LA,q,t
−τA,tΞq,A,t + (Rt+1)−1φEt[λtVt+1 + (1− λt)Jt+1]. (A.22)
Robots Production Sector
Optimisation of robots producers imply
ΠΩ,t = qtptMt − ptΩt (A.15)
Mt = Ω
η
t (A.16)
qt =
Ωt
Mtη
(A.17)
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Finally, the value of labour intensive goods and automated goods are given by
Jt = ϑΠ
j
t + (Rt+1)
−1φEt[Jt+1], and (A.26)
Vt = ϑΠ
i
t + (Rt+1)
−1φEtVt+1 (A.27)
Profits for adopters are given by the gain from marketing specialised intermedia-
ted goods net the amount paid to inventors to gain access to new goods and the
expenditures on loans to pay for adoption intensity.
ΠA,t = ϑ
∫
j∈At
Πjtdj − Ξt−1Rt − LA,tWRD,t
Household Sector
Retiree j decision problem is
maxV jrt =
{
(Cjrt )
υ + βωrt,t+1([V
jr
t+1]
υ)
}1/υ
(A.28)
subject to
Cjrt + FA
jr
t+1 =
Rt
ωrt−1,t
FAjrt + d
jr
t . (A.29)
The first order condition and envelop theorem are
(Cjrt )
υ−1 = βωrt,t+1
∂V jrt+1
∂FAjrt+1
(V jrt+1)
υ−1, (A.30)
∂V jrt
∂FAjrt
= (V jrt )
1−υ(Cjrt )
υ−1 Rt
ωrt−1,t
. (A.31)
Combining these conditions above gives the Euler equation
Cjrt+1 = (βRt+1)
1/(1−υ)Cjrt (A.32)
Conjecture that retirees consume a fraction of all assets (including financial assets,
profits from financial intermediaries), such that
Cjrt = εtςt
[
Rt
ωrt−1,t
FArjt +D
rj
t
]
. (A.33)
Combining these and the budget constraint gives
FAjrt+1 =
Rt
ωrt−1,t
FAjrt (1− εtςt) + djrt − εtςt(Drjt ).
Using the condition above the Euler equation and the solution for consumption gives
(βRt+1)
1/(1−υ)εtςt[
Rt
ωrt−1,t
FArjt +D
rj
t ] = (A.34)
εt+1ςt+1
[
Rt+1
ωrt,t+1
(
Rt
ωrt−1,t
FAjrt (1− εtςt) + djrt − εtςtDrjt
)
+Djrt+1
]
.
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∂FAjrt
∂FAjwt
= 1
ωrt−1,t
since as households are risk neutral with respect to labour income they
select the same asset profile independent of their worker/retiree status, adjusting
only for expected return due to probability of death. Combining these conditions
above, and using the conjecture that V jwt = (ςt)
−1/υCjwt , gives the Euler equation
Cjwt =
(
(βRt+1Zt+1)
1/(1−υ))−1 [ωwCjwt+1 + (1− ωw)ε−1υt+1Cjrt+1] (A.41)
where Zt+1 = (ω
w + (1− ωw)ε(υ−1)/υt+1 ).
Conjecture that retirees consume a fraction of all assets (including financial assets,
human capital and profits from financial intermediaries), such that
Cjwt = ςt[RtFA
jw
t +H
jw
t +D
jw
t ]. (A.42)
Following the same procedure as before we have that
ςt[RtFA
jw
t +H
jw
t +D
jw
t ](βRt+1Zt+1)
1/(1−υ)= (A.43)
ωwςt+1[Rt+1(RtFAjwt (1−ςt)+Wtξt+djwt −ςt(Hjwt +Djwt ))+Hjwt+1+Djwt+1]+
ε
−1
υ
t+1(1−ωw)εt+1ςt+1[Rt+1(RtFAjwt (1−ςt)+Wtξt+djwt −ςt(Hjwt +Djwt ))+Djrt+1].
Collecting terms we have that
1− εtςt =
(βRt+1)
1/(1−υ)ωrt,t+1
Rt+1
εtςt
εt+1ςt+1
, (A.35)
Djrt = d
jr
t +
ωrt,t+1
Rt+1
Djrt+1. (A.36)
One can also show that V jrt = (εtςt)
−1/υCjrt . Worker j decision problem is
maxV jwt =
{
(Cjwt )
υ + β[ωwV jwt+1 + (1− ωw)V jrt+1]υ
}1/υ
(A.37)
subject to
Cjwt + FA
jw
t+1 = RtFA
jw
t +Wtξt + d
jw
t − τ jwt . (A.38)
∂V jrt
∂FAjwt
=
∂V jrt
∂FAjrt
∂FAjrt
∂FAjwt
=
∂V jrt
∂FAjrt
1
ωrt−1,t
= (V jrt )
1−υ(Cjrt )
υ−1Rt. (A.40)
First order conditions and envelop theorem yield
(Cjwt )
υ−1 = β[ωwV jwt+1 + (1− ωw)V jrt+1]υ−1
[
ωw
∂V jwt+1
∂FAjwt+1
+ (1− ωw) ∂V
jr
t+1
∂FAjwt+1
]
,
∂V jwt
∂FAjwt
= (V jwt+1)
1−υ(Cjwt )
υ−1Rt, and (A.39)
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The profits of the financial intermediary are
ΠFt = [r
k
t + 1]Kt +RtBt −Rt(FAwt + FArt )−Kt+1 − Bt+1 + FAwt+1 + FArt+1 +
+(ΠA,t +ΠRD,t + (1− ϑ)
(∫
j∈At
Πjtdj +
∫
i∈Zt\At
Πitdi
)
+ΠΩ,t), (A.54)
where Bt+1 = St + Ξt and FAt = FA
w
t + FA
r
t .
The financial intermediaries selects capital and bonds such that it maximise
profits and thus we obtain the standard arbitrage conditions whereby all assets
must pay the same expected return, thus
Et
[
rkt+1 + 1
]
= Rt. (A.55)
Also note that under a perfect foresight solution, by ensuring the financial in-
termediary behaves under perfect competition, this equality holds without expecta-
tions, ΠFt = 0 and thus d
r
t = d
w
t = 0. If Π
F
t = 0, then we assume profits are divided
FAr FAw
Collecting terms and simplifying we have that
ςt = 1− ςt
ςt+1
(βRt+1Zt+1)
1/(1−υ)
Rt+1Zt,t+1
(A.44)
Hjwt = (W
j
t ) +
ωw
Rt+1Zt,t+1
Hjwt+1 and (A.45)
Djwt = d
jw
t +
ωw
Rt+1Zt,t+1
Djwt+1 +
(1− ωw)ε(υ−1)/υt+1
Rt+1Zt,t+1
Djrt+1. (A.46)
Note that ωrt,t+1 is not shown in the last equation due to the perfect annuity market
for retirees, allowing for the redistribution of assets of retirees who died at the end
of the period.
Financial Intermediary
Aggregation across households
Assume that for any variable Xjzt we have that X
z
t =
∫ Nzt
0
Xjzt for z = {w, r},
then
Lt = N
wL
t , (A.47)
LI,t + LA,t = N
wRD
t , (A.48)
Hwt = (Wt)N
wL
t + (W
RD
t )N
wRD
t +
ωw
Rt+1Zt,t+1
Hwt+1
Nwt
Nwt+1
, (A.49)
Dwt = d
w
t +
ωw
Rt+1Zt,t+1
Dwt+1N
w
t
Nwt+1
+
(1− ωw)ε(υ−1)/υt+1
Rt+1Zt,t+1
Drt+1N
w
t
N rt+1
, (A.50)
Cwt = ςt[RtFA
w
t +H
w
t +D
w
t − Twt ], (A.51)
Drt = d
r
t +
ωrt,t+1
Rt+1
Drt+1
N rt
N rt+1
, (A.52)
Crt = εtςt[RtFA
r
t +D
r
t ]. (A.53)
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t t t t 
based on the ratio of assets. As such, drt = Π
F
t
FArt
FArt+FA
w
t
and dwt = Π
F
t
FAwt
FArt+FA
w
t
. The
flow of capital is then given by
Kt+1 = Kt(1− δ) + It. (A.56)
Where It is the investment in capital made by the financial intermediary.
Asset Markets
Asset Market clearing implies
FAt+1 = FA
w
t+1 + FA
r
t+1 = Kt+1 +Bt+1 (A.57)
Finally, the flow of assets are given by
FArt+1 = RtFA
r
t + d
r
t − Crt + (1− ωw)(RtFAwt +WtξtLt + dwt − Cwt − τt) (A.58)
FAwt+1 = ω
w(RtFA
w
t +WtξtLt + d
w
t − Cwt − τt) (A.59)
Clearing conditions
yt = Cw,t + Cr,t +Υt + Ωt + It (A.60)
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (A.61)
Kt =
∫
j∈At
kjtdj +
∫
i∈Zt\At
kitdi (A.62)
Υt =
∫
j∈At
Υjtdj +
∫
i∈Zt\At
Υitdi (A.63)
Mt =
∫
j∈At
M jt dj (A.64)
NwRt =
∫
q
LA,q,tdi+
∫
p
Li,q,tdiN
wL
t =
∫
i∈Zt\At
Litdi (A.65)
(A.66)
Appendix B. Detrended equilibrium conditions
This section shows the detrended equilibrium conditions. Note that x¯ denotes the
steady state of variable xt.
wt = lst + lit + lat (A.67a)
hwt = wt +
ωw
Rt+1Zt,t+1
gt+1h
w
t+1
gwt+1
where hwt =
Hwt
Yt
, gt+1 =
Yt+1
Yt
, gwt+1 =
Nwt+1
Nwt
(A.67b)
D˜rt = d˜
r
t +
ωrt,t+1
Rt+1
gt+1
D˜rt+1ζ
r
t
ζrt+1g
w
t+1
where D˜rt =
Drt
Yt
, d˜rt =
drt
Yt
(A.67c)
D˜wt = d˜
w
t +
ωw
Rt+1Zt,t+1
gt+1D˜
w
t+1
gwt+1
+
(1− ωw)ε(υ−1)/υt+1
Rt+1Zt,t+1
gt+1D˜
r
t+1
ζrt+1g
w
t+1
where D˜wt =
Dwt
Yt
, d˜wt =
dwt
Yt
(A.67d)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 46 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2004
cwt = ςt[Rt
fawt
gt
+ hwt + D˜
w
t ] where fa
w
t =
FAwt
Yc,t−1
, cwt =
Cwt
Yt
(A.67e)
crt = εtςt[Rt
fart
gt
+ D˜rt ] where fa
r
t =
FArt
Yc,t−1
, crt =
Cwt
Yt
(A.67f)
1− εtςt =
(βRt+1)
1/(1−υ)ωrt,t+1
Rt+1
εtςt
εt+1ςt+1
(A.67g)
ςt = 1− ςt
ςt+1
(βRt+1Zt+1)
1
(1−υ)
Rt+1Zt,t+1
(A.67h)
Zt+1 = (ω
w + (1− ωw)ε(υ−1)/υt+1 ) (A.67i)
ζwRDt+1 g
w
t+1 = ω
y
t,t+1SwRD + (1− dropRD)ωwζwRDt where ζwRDt =
NwRDt
Nwt
(A.68a)
ζwLt+1g
w
t+1 = ω
y
t,t+1(1− SwRD) + ωwζwLt + (dropRD)ωwζwRDt where ζwLt =
NwLt
Nwt
(A.68b)
gwt+1 = ω
w + (1− ωy) (A.68c)
ζrt+1 =
(
(1− ωw) + ωrt,t+1ζrt
)
(ωw + (1− ωy))−1 where ζrt =
N rt
Nwt
(A.68d)
gnt+1 =
(1 + ζrt+1)
(1 + ζrt )
gwt+1 where g
n
t+1 =
Nt+1
Nt
(A.68e)
Note that all firms j ∈ At take the same decisions, then
∫
j∈At k
j
tdj = Atk
j
t . A
similar argument holds for firms i ∈ Zt \ At.
km,t =
α(1− γI)
(rkt + δ)
ψ − 1
ψ
ym,tgt where km,t =
Atk
j
t
Yt−1
, ym,t =
(pjt/pt)y
j
tAt
Yt
(A.69a)
Υm,t = γI
ψ − 1
ψ
ym,t where Υm,t =
AtΥ
j
t
Yt
(A.69b)
mt = (1− α)(1− γI)ψ − 1
ψ
ym,t where mt =
Atm
j
tqt
Yt
=
qtMt
Yt
(A.69c)
gpm,t =
(
(rkt + δ)
(rkt−1 + δ)
)α(1−γI)(θt−1
θt
)(1−α)(1−γI)
g
(1−α)(1−γI)
q,t where gpm,t =
(pj,t/pt)
(pj,t−1/pt−1)
, gq,t =
qt
qt−1
(A.69d)
ym,t
ym,t−1
= gAt g
1−ψ
pm,t, where g
A
t =
At
At−1
(A.69e)
πm,t =
1
ψ
ym,t where πm,t =
AtΠ
j
t
Yt
(A.69f)
kL,t =
α(1− γI)
(rkt + δ)
ψ − 1
ψ
yL,tgt where kL,t =
(Zt − At)kit
Yt−1
, yL,t =
(pi,t/pt)y
i
t(Zt − At)
Yt
(A.69g)
ΥL,t = γI
ψ − 1
ψ
yL,t where ΥL,t =
(Zt − At)Υit
Yt
(A.69h)
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lst = (1− α)(1− γI)ψ − 1
ψ
yL,t where lst =
(Wt)N
wL
t
Yt
(A.69i)
lst/lst−1 = lspopt/lspopt−1(g
wg
t g
n
t−1)/gt where g
wg
t =
Wt
Wt−1
(A.69j)
yL,t
yL,t−1
= gZAt g
1−ψ
pL,t , where g
ZA
t =
(Zt − At)
(Zt−1 − At−1) where gpL,t =
(pi,t/pt)
(pi,t−1/pt−1)
(A.69k)
gpL,t =
(
(rkt + δ)
(rkt−1 + δ)
)α(1−γI)( lst
lst−1
)(1−α)(1−γI)( gt
gL,t
)(1−α)(1−γI)
where gL,t =
Lt
Lt−1
= gw,t
(A.69l)
πL,t =
1
ψ
yL,t where πL,t =
(Zt − At)Πit
Yt
(A.69m)
mt =
Ω˜t
η
where Ω˜t =
Ωt
Yt
(A.69n)
πΩ,t = mt − Ω˜t where πΩ,t = ΠΩ,t
Yt
(A.69o)
mt
mt−1
=
(
Ω˜t
Ω˜t−1
)η
(gt)
η−1gq,t (A.69p)
gZt+1 = χ
(st
Ψ t
)ρ
(lipopt)
κL + φ where gZt =
Zt
Zt−1
, st =
St
Yt
,Ψt =
Ψ˜t
Yt
, lipopt =
LI,t
Nt
(A.70a)
gAt+1 = λtφ[1/az,t − 1] + φ where az,t =
At
Zt
(A.70b)
gZAt = g
Z
t
1− az,t
1− az,t−1 (A.70c)
azt = azt−1
gAt
gZt
(A.70d)
st = κRDgt+1R
−1
t+1φjt+1
(
gZt+1 − φ
gZt+1(1− az,t+1)
)
where jt =
Jt(Zt − At)
Yt
(A.70e)
lit = st
κL
κRD
where lit =
LI,tWRD,t
Yt
(A.70f)
lit/lit−1 = lipopt/lipopt−1(gwrdt g
n
t−1)/gt where g
wrd
t =
WRD,t
WRD,t−1
(A.70g)
vt = ϑπm,t + (Rt+1)
−1φ
gt+1
gAt+1
vt+1 where vt =
VtAt
Yt
(A.70h)
jt = ϑπL,t + (Rt+1)
−1φ
gt+1
gZAt+1
jt+1 (A.70i)
t = λλtR
−1
t+1φgt+1
[
vt+1
gAt+1
[1/az,t − 1]− jt+1
gZAt+1
]
where t =
Ξt
Yt
(A.70j)
lat = t
κL
κRD
where lat =
LA,tWRD,t
Yt
(A.70k)
lat/lat−1 = lapopt/lapopt−1(gwrdt g
n
t−1)/gt (A.70l)
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λt = λ
((
t
Ψt
)κRD
lapopκLt
)
≈ λ¯
(
1 + λ
(
κRD
t − ¯
¯
− κRDΨt − Ψ¯
Ψ¯
+ κL
lapopt − ¯lapop
¯lapop
))
(A.70m)
πAt = ϑπm,t −Rtt−1/gt − lit (A.70n)
πRDt = ϑπL,t −Rtst−1/gt − lat (A.70o)
where λ is the elasticity of λ(·)
rkt+1 + 1 = Rt+1 (A.71a)
fart+1 =
Rt
gt
fart + d˜
r
t − crt + (1− ωw)
(
Rt
gt
fawt + wt + d˜
w
t − cwt
)
(A.72j)
fat+1 = fa
w
t+1 + fa
r
t+1 (A.72k)
Ψt = vt (A.72l)
fawt+1 = ω
w
(
Rt
gt
fawt + wt + d˜
w
t − cwt
)
kt = km,t + kL,t (A.72d)
Υ˜t = Υm,t +ΥL,t (A.72e)
1 = ym,t + yL,t (A.72f)
d˜rt = π
F
t
fart
fat
where πFt =
ΠFt
Yt
(A.71b)
d˜wt = π
F
t
fawt
fat
(A.71c)
bt+1 = st +t where bt+1 =
Bt+1
Yt
(A.71d)
lipopt + lapopt =
ζwRDt
1 + ζyt + ζ
r
t
where ζwRDt =
NwRDt
Nwt
(A.72b)
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt
gt
+ it where it =
It
Yt
(A.72c)
1 = ct + it + st +t + Ω˜t + Υ˜t where ct =
Ct
Yt
(A.72g)
ct = c
w
t + c
r
t (A.72h)
fawt+1 + fa
r
t+1 = kt+1 + bt+1 (A.72i)
πFt = (r
k
t + 1)
kt
gt
+
Rt
gt
bt − Rt
gt
(fat)− kt+1 − bt+1 + (fat+1) + πAt + πRDt + (1− ϑ)(πm,t + πL,t)
(A.71e)
lspop =
ζwLt
1 + ζrt
(A.72a)
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dgZ
gZ + φ
= ρ
ds
s
− ρdv
v
+ κL
dlipop
lipop
(A.73a)
ds
s
= −dR
R
+
dj
j
+
az
(1− az)
daz
az
+
dg
g
+
φ
gZ
dgZ
gZ + φ
(A.73b)
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proposition 2 focuses on changes on population growth (dgn), maintaining demo-
graphic structure (age shares) constant and thus dRDpop = 0. Combining (A.73)
we obtain two conditions linking labour output share and the degree of automation
with changes in population growth and changes in interest rates
−1
η
ρ
κL
Γ1
dgn
gn
− ρ
κL
dR
R
= −c1daz
az
− d1 dyL
yL(1− yL)
−1
η
κRD
κL
Γ2
dgn
gn
− κRD
κL
dR
R
= c2
daz
az
+ d2
dyL
yL(1− yL)
dgZ
gZ + φ
=
dλ
λ
− 1
(1− az)
daz
az
(A.73c)
dλ
λ
= λκRD
(
d

− dv
v
)
+ λκL
dlapop
lapop
(A.73d)
d	
	
= dλ
λ
− dR
R
+ dg
g
+ dg
Z
gZ
+
v[1/az−1]
v[1/az−1]−j
dv
v
− j
v[1/az−1]−j
dj
j
− v[1/az−1]
v[1/az−1]−j
1
1−az
daz
az
(A.73e)
dv
v
= − dyL
(1− yL) − Γ
dR
R
− Γdg
Z
gZ
+ Γ
dg
g
, where Γ =
φg
gZR(
1− φg
gZR
)2 (A.73f)
dj
j
=
dyL
yL
− ΓdR
R
− Γdg
Z
gZ
+ Γ
dg
g
(A.73g)
dlapop
lapop
− dlipop
lipop
=
d

− ds
s
(A.73h)
dg
g
=
1
η
dgn
gn
(A.73i)
dgz
gz
=
(1− η)(ψ − 1)(1− α)(1− γI)
η
dgn
gn
(A.73j)
dlapop+ dlipop = dRDpop (A.73k)
Appendix C. Comparative Analysis
In this section of the appendix we present the proofs of Proposition 2 and 3. For
both propositions we use the main detrended equilibrium conditions from firms,
innovators and automation investors optimisation problems depicted above.
Total differentiation around the BGP equilibrium of the core equilibrium condi-
tions for R&D, (A.70), using Ψt = vt and (A.69a) to replace for πL and πm we
obtain
where RDpop ≡ NwRDt
Nt
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 50 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2004
To conclude the proof of Proposition 2 we need to ensure the denominator is
positive. From the definitions of c1, c2, d1, and d2 and as λκRD  1 we have that
c2d1 > c˜2d1 =
1
λκL(1− az)
(
v[1/az − 1]
v[1/az − 1]− j
)
ρ
κL
+
(RDpop− lapop)
RDpop
(v + j)
v[1/az − 1]− j
ρ
κL
+
1
λκL(1− az)
(
v[1/az − 1]
v[1/az − 1]− j
)
lapop
RDpop
v[1/az − 1]
v[1/az − 1]− j
+
(RDpop− lapop)
RDpop
(v + j)
v[1/az − 1]− j
lapop
RDpop
v[1/az − 1]
v[1/az − 1]− j
c1d2 =
ρ
κL
az
(1− az)
λκRD
λκL
j
v[1/az − 1]− j +
ρ
κL
az
(1− az)
(RDpop− lapop)
RDpop
v[1/az − 1]
v[1/az − 1]− j
+
lapop
RDpop
(v + j)
v[1/az − 1]− j
(RDpop− lapop)
RDpop
v[1/az − 1]
v[1/az − 1]− j
+
lapop
RDpop
(v + j)
v[1/az − 1]− j
λκRD
λκL
j
v[1/az − 1]− j
where
c1 ≡
(
lapop
RDpop
(v + j)
v[1/az − 1]− j +
ρ
κL
az
(1− az)
)
> 0
c2 ≡
(
(RDpop− lapop)
RDpop
(v + j)
v[1/az − 1]− j +
1
λκL
(
1 + λκRD
j
v[1/az − 1]− j
)
1
(1− az)
)
> 0
d1 ≡
(
lapop
RDpop
v[1/az − 1]
v[1/az − 1]− j +
ρ
κL
)
> 0
d2 ≡
(
λκRD
λκL
j
v[1/az − 1]− j +
(RDpop− lapop)
RDpop
v[1/az − 1]
v[1/az − 1]− j
)
> 0
Γ1 ≡
(
gZ
φ
− ρ
(gZ + φ)
(1− η)(ψ − 1)(1− α)(1− γI)− 1
)
> 0
dls
ls
= (1− yL)
1
η
(
c1
κRD
κL
Γ2 +
ρ
κL
Γ1c2
)
dgn
gn
+
(
c1
κRD
κL
+ ρ
κL
c2
)
dR
R
c2d1 − d2c1 (A.75)
The first four inequalities follow from the fact that on any BGP ,  > 0 ⇒ [v[1/az−
1] − j] > 0, and az < 1 and the last two since φ, κRD  1 and from assumption 2
(A2).
Then, as the labour income share is given by lst = (1 − α)(1 − γI)ψ−1ψ yL,t we
have that
daz
az
=
− 1
η
(
d1
κRD
κL
Γ2 +
ρ
κL
Γ1d2
)
dgn
gn
−
(
d1
κRD
κL
+ ρ
κL
d2
)
dR
R
c2d1 − d2c1 (A.74)
Γ2 ≡
(
gZ
λκRD
− φ
(gZ + φ)
(1− η)(ψ − 1)(1− α)(1− γI)− 1
)
> 0
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c˜2d1 − c1d2 = ρ
λκ2L(1− az)
(
v[1/az − 1]− azj
v[1/az − 1]− j
)
+
1
azλκL
lapop
RDpop
(
v(v[1/az − 1])− λκRDazj)
(v[1/az − 1]− j)2
)
+
κRD
λκL
lapop
RDpop
(
ρφ
az
− λ
)
j2
(v[1/az − 1]− j)2
As the denominator is positive that concludes the proof of proposition 3.
Note that (RDpop−lapop)
RDpop
= lipop
RDpop
= lapop
RDpop
lipop
lapop
= lapop
RDpop
s

.
As s

=
κRDgR
−1φj
(
gZ−φ
gZ (1−az)
)
λ
gZ−φ
φ[1/az−1]R
−1φ g
gZ
[v[1/az−1]−j]
= κRDφj
λaz [v[1/az−1]−j] then
(RDpop−lapop)
RDpop
= lapop
RDpop
φj
λaz [v[1/az−1]−j] , and thus
As v[1/az − 1]− j > v[1/az − 1]− azj > 0 it is sufficient that az  ρφλ to ensure
c2d1 − c1d2 > c˜2d1 − c1d2 > 0. Note that given that the first two terms are positive,
and the first increases as az increases, even when A1 does not hold, and the third
term is negative the denominator may still be positive.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Proposition 3 assumes population growth is keep constant, dgn = 0 (which im-
plies dg = dgZ = 0), and focuses on changes in the demographic structure particu-
larly considering an increase the share of retirees (ageing) and thus dRDpop < 0.
Combining (A.73) we obtain two conditions linking labour output share and the
degree of automation with changes in demographic structure and changes in interest
rates. The system of equation, using the definitions of c1, c2, d1 and d2, becomes
dRDpop
RDpop
− ρ
κL
dR
R
= −c1daz
az
− d1 dyL
yL(1− yL)
dRDpop
RDpop
− κRD
κL
dR
R
= c2
daz
az
+ d2
dyL
yL(1− yL)
As the labour income share is given by lst = (1−α)(1− γI)ψ−1ψ yL,t we have that
daz
az
=
dRDpop
RDpop
(d1 + d2)−
(
d1
κRD
κL
+ ρ
κL
d2
)
dR
R
c2d1 − d2c1 (A.76)
dls
ls
= (1− yL)
−
(
dRDpop
RDpop
(c1 + c2)−
(
c1
κRD
κL
+ ρ
κL
c2
)
dR
R
)
c2d1 − d2c1 (A.77)
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Country US Year 1993
Parameter Value Target/Source
Birth Rate ωn = 0.0265 Share of Workers in Population
Death Probability of Old Agents 1− ωo = 0.07 Share of Old in Population Country
Country US Year 2055
Parameter Value Target/Source
Birth Rate ωn = 0.0236 Share of Workers in Population
Death Probability of Old Agents 1− ωo = 0.037 Share of Old in Population Country
Country Europe Year 1993
Parameter Value Target/Source
Birth Rate ωn = 0.0253 Share of Workers in Population
Death Probability of Old Agents 1− ωo = 0.06 Share of Old in Population Country
Country Europe Year 2055
Parameter Value Target/Source
Birth Rate ωn = 0.0206 Share of Workers in Population
Death Probability of Old Agents 1− ωo = 0.024 Share of Old in Population
Appendix D. More on Calibration
This Section reports the values of the set of parameters of the model.
Table A.1: Calibration
Parameter Value Target/Source
Time Discount Factor β = 0.96 Standard Value
Elasticity Intertemporal Substitution υ = −3 EIS = 0.25 (Gertler(1999))
Capital Depreciation Rate δ = 0.08 Standard Value
Capital Share in Production α = 0.33 Standard Value
Intermediate Share in Production γI = 0.5 Comin and Gertler(2006)
Elasticity Substitution of Varieties ψ = 8 Standard Value
Obsolescence φ = 0.85 Growth per Working age person
Productivity Innovation χ = 5.67 Share of innovation expenditure in GDP
Elasticity of Investment to Innovation ρ = 0.9 Comin and Gertler (2006)
Elasticity of Final Goods to R&D Investment κRD = 1 Comin and Gertler (2006)
Elasticity of Labour to R&D Investment κL = 0.5 Aksoy et al. (2018)
Rate of Automation λ = 0.1 Share of Automated Varieties
Robots Production Function η = 0.15 Balanced Growth
Probability Transition from Mature to Old 1− ωw = 0.022 Avg. Number of Years as Worker: 45y
Share of Workers in R&D SwRD = 0.07 Share of R&D workers in Population
Probability Workers leaves R&D dropRD = 0.07 Average age of R&D workers
Table A.2: Calibration - Demographic Transition
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Note: Demographic Calibration: initial point 1990 - End point of 2055
The figure plots the effects of the projected demographic changes in each region. For Per Capita
Output growth = (yt/yt−1)(Nt−1/Nt), Share of Workers in Population - Nwt /Nt and Growth Rate
of real wage - Wt/Wt−1 we show the Change relative to the initial BGP . For Share of Automated
Sector - ym,t, Labour Share of Output WtLt/yt, Rt - Real Interest Rate and Consumption - Ct/yt
we show the percentage change relative to the initial BGP . For the price of robots we show the ratio
of price of robots during the transition and on the BGP - qt/qBGP .
Then, we present additional simulation considering one case where the start year
is 1990 instead of 1993, thus the demographic transition occurs from 1990 till 2055
and one case the start year is 1995 and the end year is 2060 instead of 2055. In
both cases we depict the simulated variables from 2000 till 2040. In the first case
the first 10 years of simulated data are discarded and in the second the first 5 years
are discarded.
Note: The figure plots the effects of the projected demographic changes in each region. For Per
Capita Output growth = (yt/yt−1)(Nt−1/Nt) we show the Change relative to the initial BGP , for
the Share of Automated Sector - ym,t and Consumption - Ct/yt we show the percentage change
relative to the initial BGP .
Appendix E. Additional Simulation Results
First we show the impulse response to a shock to χ, the efficiency of innovation
investment, discussed in Corollary 1.
Figure A.1: Response to Permanent Increase in Investment Innovation Efficiency (χ)
Figure A.2: Demographic Transition: United States and Europe
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Appendix F. Model Extensions
We present the three more elaborate extensions of the model and then present the
proof of proposition ??.
F.1 Extension - Labour Choice Model
Under this extension, SwRD,t, the share of new workers that enter the economy
and work in the R&D sector, is endogenous. In order to obtain that we assume a
household, when entering her working life selects in which labour market (R&D or
intermediate good production) to participate. At entry she is randomly assigned
an efficiency level in R&D activity, denoted ξν˜it , where ν˜
i
t is drawn from a Pareto
distribution with shape parameter  > 1 and support [1,∞). We denote the cumu-
lative distribution by F (ν). The household then compares the human capital gain
under the R&D sector (HRDt ) which is a function of the wage W
RD and the average
efficiency of workers in the sector, denoted νm,t, and the human capital gain in the
production sector (Ht, which is a function of the wage W ) and selects in which
labour market to be active in.
There exists a cut-off point ν∗t such that given H
RD
t and Ht the household is
indifferent between choosing each sector. Then, the share of households in R&D is
given by
SwRD,t =
∫ ∞
ν∗t
dF (ν) =
∫ ∞
ν∗t
1
ν+1
dν =
∫ ∞
ν∗t
ν−(+1) = (ν∗t )

Note: Demographic Calibration: initial point 1995 - End point of 2060
The figure plots the effects of the projected demographic changes in each region. For Per Capita
Output growth = (yt/yt−1)(Nt−1/Nt), Share of Workers in Population - Nwt /Nt and Growth Rate
of real wage - Wt/Wt−1 we show the Change relative to the initial BGP . For Share of Automated
Sector - ym,t, Labour Share of Output WtLt/yt, Rt - Real Interest Rate and Consumption - Ct/yt
we show the percentage change relative to the initial BGP . For the price of robots we show the ratio
of price of robots during the transition and on the BGP - qt/qBGP .
Figure A.3: Demographic Transition: United States and Europe
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31We also considered a case where we set κL = 0, so that the R&D sector does not need labour to innovate
or automate. Results are similar to the Labour Choice case indicating that by allowing workers to migrate to
research while young the labour supply constraint on research activity is almost fully mitigated.
Following similar steps as in the benchmark model we get
Cjrt = εtςt
[
Rt
ωrt−1,t
FArjt +H
jr
t +D
rj
t
]
1− εtςt =
(
βRt+1
(
Wt
Wt+1
)(1−μL)υ)1/(1−υ)
ωrt,t+1
Rt+1
εtςt
εt+1ςt+1
Djrt = d
jr
t +
ωrt,t+1
Rt+1
Djrt+1.
Hjrt = ξWtl
jr
t +
ωrt,t+1
Rt+1
Hjrt+1.
The average efficiency of entrants in the R&D labour market is
νE,t =
∫∞
ν∗t
ξνdF (ν)
1− F (ν∗t )
=
∫∞
ν∗t
ξν−()dν
1− F (ν∗t )
= ξ

− 1ν
∗
t
The average efficiency of all workers in the R&D sector is then given by
νm,t =
SwRD,tω
y
t,t+1N
w
t
NwRDt+1
νE,t + (1− dropRD)ωwNwRDt NwRDt+1 νm,t−1
Defining
Hjwt = (Wt) +
ωw
Rt+1Zt,t+1
Hjwt+1, where j works in production
H iwRDt = (νm,tW
RD
t ) +
ωw
Rt+1Zt,t+1
H iwRDt+1 , where i works in R&D
And since νm,t is a function of ν
∗
t , ν
∗
t is such that H
jw
t = H
iwRD
t . Finally, we calibrate
 and ξ to obtain the same effective wage in R&D and SwRD at steady state as in
the benchmark model.31
subject to
Cjrt + FA
jr
t+1 =
Rt
ωrt−1,t
FAjrt + ξWtl
jr
t + d
jr
t .
F.2 Labour Supply - Intensive Margin
In this extension we assume that all households also decide how much labour to
supply (we allow retirees to also supply labour, although
Retiree j decision problem is
maxV jrt =
{
(Cjrt )
υμL(χr − ljrt )υ(1−μL) + βωrt,t+1([V jrt+1]υ)
}1/υ
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Following the same procedure as before we have that
CjwRt = ςtot[RtFA
jwR
t +H
jwR
t +D
jwR
t ]
1− otςt
ot
= 1− ςt
ςt+1
(
βRt+1Z
RD
t+1
(
WRDt
Wt+1
)(1−μL)υ)1/(1−υ)
Rt+1ZRDt,t+1
HjwRt = (W
RD
t l
jwRD
t ) +
ωw
Rt+1ZRDt,t+1
Hjwt+1 +
(1− ωw) (1/ξ)1−μL ε(υ−1)/υt+1
Rt+1ZRDt,t+1
Hjwt+1
(χr − ljrt ) =
μLC
jr
t
ξWt(1− μL)
V jrt = (εtςt)
−1/υCjrt (χr − ljrt )
With endogenous labour supply wages affect the marginal propensity to consume.
As a result we can no longer solve a single problem for all workers.
Production workers j decision problem is
maxV jwt =
{
(Cjwt )
μLυ(χw − ljwt )υ(1−μL) + β[ωwV jwt+1 + (1− ωw)V jrt+1]υ
}1/υ
subject to
Cjwt + FA
jw
t+1 = RtFA
jw
t +Wtl
jw
t + d
jw
t
Following the same procedure as before we have that
Cjwt = ςt[RtFA
jw
t +H
jw
t +D
jw
t ]
ςt = 1− ςt
ςt+1
(
βRt+1Zt+1
(
Wt
Wt+1
)(1−μL)υ)1/(1−υ)
Rt+1Zt,t+1
Hjwt = (Wtl
jw
t ) +
ωw
Rt+1Zt,t+1
Hjwt+1 +
(1− ωw) (1/ξ)1−μL ε(υ−1)/υt+1
Rt+1Zt,t+1
Hjwt+1
Djwt = d
jw
t +
ωw
Rt+1Zt,t+1
Djwt+1 +
(1− ωw) (1/ξ)1−μL ε(υ−1)/υt+1
Rt+1Zt,t+1
Djrt+1
(χw − ljwt ) =
μLC
jw
t
Wt(1− μL)
V jwt = (εtςt)
−1/υCjwt (χw − ljwt )
Zt+1 = (ω
w + (1− ωw)ε(υ−1)/υt+1 ).
R&D workers j decision problem is
maxV jwRt =
{
(CjwRt )
μLυ(χwR − ljwRt )υ(1−μL) + β[ωw(1− dropRD)V jwRt+1
+ωw(dropRD)V
jw
t+1 + (1− ωw)V jrt+1]υ
}1/υ
subject to
CjwRt + FA
jwR
t+1 = RtFA
jwR
t +W
RD
t l
jwR
t + d
jwR
t
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+
(1− ωw)dropRD
(
Wt+1
WRDt+1
)(1−μL)υ
o
(υ−1)/υ
t+1
Rt+1ZRDt,t+1
HjwRDt+1
DjwRt = (W
RD
t l
jwRD
t ) +
ωw
Rt+1ZRDt,t+1
Djwt+1 +
(1− ωw) (1/ξ)1−μL ε(υ−1)/υt+1
Rt+1ZRDt,t+1
Djwt+1
+
(1− ωw)dropRD
(
Wt+1
WRDt+1
)(1−μL)υ
o
(υ−1)/υ
t+1
Rt+1ZRDt,t+1
DjwRDt+1
(χwR − lwRt ) =
μLC
jwR
t
Wt(1− μL)
V jwRt = (εtςt)
−1/υCjwRt (χwR − ljwRt )
ZRDt+1 = ((1− ωw)dropRDo(υ−1)/υt+1
(
Wt+1
WRDt+1
)1−μL
ωwdropRD + (1− ωw)ε(υ−1)/υt+1 ).
Finally, in order to ensure unique transition path we assume innovators and
automation investors pay a cot to adjust labour demand given by 
2
(LX,t−gnLX,t−1)2,
for X = I, A.
Allowing for adjustment of labour supply in the intensive margin affects the
impact of the demographic transition in the medium run. However, as the economy
converges to a new steady state, labour supply of each workers converges to a
constant and thus the growth rate of labour employed in production becomes equal
to the population growth gL,t = gn,t. Thus, the individual effective labour supply
remains constant on a BGP and the conditions driving the result in proposition 1
remain constant.
F.3 Depreciation of Robots
We assume at every period robots producers start with (1−δR)Mt amount of robots
and invest Ωt and get I
R
t = (Ωt)
η. Robots are rented to firms at a price qt. Problem
of robots producers is
max
Ω,t
∞∑
t=0
βtΠΩ,t = qtMt − Ωt s.t. Mt = Ωηt + (1− δR)Mt−1. (A.78)
Maximisation conditions are
ηqt
Ω1−ηt
= 1− (1− δR)Ω
1−η
t+1
Ω1−ηt+1
(A.79)
Mt = Ω
η
t + (1− δR)Mt−1 (A.80)
If (A.79) holds then on a BGP , (gt)
η−1gq,t = 1 and Ωtyt is constant. Thus, (??) in
proposition 1 continues to hold and thus restriction on η to ensure BGP exists is
unchanged in this extension.
F.4 Long-run Effect Under Alternative Scenarios
Proof of Proposition ??: Using the optimisations conditions of firms and robot’s
producers we set the system of equations that determine output growth. As we have
seen from proposition one, this set of equations are made of the two equations that
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First consider the two extensions that alters the function of labour markets. The
first extension, Labour Choice, allow young workers who enter the labour market
to select which sector to supply labour. This decision is function of the ratio of
wage in R&D, WRD, and the wage in the labour-intensive sector W . During the
demographic transition as the ratio of wages changes, SwRD, the share of workers in
R&D, increases, labour supply in production falls and thus gL,t =
Lt
Lt−1
falls relative
to the benchmark model. However, as the economy approaches the new BGP with
a stationary demographic composition, the growth rate of WRD and W are matched
and thus SwRD is constant on a BGP . To see this note that from (A.69f) and
(A.69k) lit + lat = (LI,t + LA,t)WRD/Yt = (N
wRD
t )WRD/Yt is constant on a BGP
and from (A.68i), lst = N
wL
t Wt/Yt is also constant. As N
wRD
t +N
wL
t = N
w
t , a BGP
with constant output shares implies gwt =
Nwt
Nwt−1
= gwRDt =
NwRDt
NwRDt−1
= gwLt =
NwLt
NwLt−1
.
As such the growth rate of labour supply in this extension is the same as in the
benchmark case and is given by gL,t =
Lt
Lt−1
= gw,t =
Nwt
Nwt−1
= gn,t. Thus, the set of
conditions above deliver the same result as in the benchmark case: gηt = gL,t = gn,t.
A similar argument is developed for the second extension, Late Retirement. In
this extension, we assume that while longevity is increasing (ωr), we assume ωw,
also increases, such that the portion of life in retirement does not increase relative
to life as a workers. Once the economy approaches to a stationary demographic
composition, the share of workers and retirees remains constant and their growth
is matched and is a function of fertility and longevity, which are the same in all
extensions. Thus, once again, gL,t = gn,t, and g
η
t = gn,t.
The extension that allows robots to be used in R&D, Robots in R&D, alters the
creation of goods and automation activity such that it does not rely on labour but
on labour and robots. The main effect of such change is to curtail the increase in
WRD that hampers innovation and automation during the demographic transition
as the share of young entering the economy and supply labour in the R&D sector
decreases. Nonetheless, as discuss in Corollary 1, on the BGP , gZ is ultimately
a function of population growth. Also note that robots and labour growth at the
determine the growth of relative prices in each sector (gpm,t, gpL,t), the two demand
equation for output in each sector coming from the final good optimisation condi-
tions which determine the change in the relative output share in each sector (ym,t,
yL,t) and the production function in the robots production sector that determines
the change in robots-output ratio (mt). Formally,
gpm,t =
(
(rkt + δ)
(rkt−1 + δ)
)α(1−γI)(θt−1
θt
)(1−α)(1−γI)
g
(1−α)(1−γI)
q,t (A.81a)
ym,t
ym,t−1
= gAt g
1−ψ
pm,t (A.81b)
gpL,t =
(
(rkt + δ)
(rkt−1 + δ)
)α(1−γI)( lst
lst−1
)(1−α)(1−γI)( gt
gL,t
)(1−α)(1−γI)
(A.81c)
yL,t
yL,t−1
= gZAt g
1−ψ
pL,t (A.81d)
mt
mt−1
=
(
Ω˜t
Ω˜t−1
)η
(gt)
η−1gq,t. (A.81e)
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Combining (A.82), (A.83) and (A.84)
g
ηˆ+μ(ψ−1)(1−α)(1−γI )
1+μ(ψ−1)(1−α)(1−γI )
t = gn,t (A.85)
Since the benchmark in all extensions have the same initial level of output growth
and population growth, the calibration procedure implies ηˆ+μ(ψ−1)(1−α)(1−γI)
1+μ(ψ−1)(1−α)(1−γI) = ηBenchmark.
As a result, due to the calibration, gηt = g
ηˆ+μ(ψ−1)(1−α)(1−γI )
1+μ(ψ−1)(1−α)(1−γI )
t = gn,t, and as gn,t changes
the effect on gt is the same in all extensions.
In order to illustrate this result we show the long-run effect on per capita growth
of the demographic changes projected for the US using the calibrated versions of the
benchmark and four extensions in Figure A.4. Note that in this long-run simulation,
Note: The figure plots the effects of the projected demographic changes under different specifications.
For Per Capita Output growth = (yt/yt−1)(Nt−1/Nt) we show the Change relative to the initial
BGP .
the demographic transition continues to occur from 1993 until 2055. Thus from
2055 fertility and longevity no longer change. However, the economy has takes
considerably longer to reach the new BGP .
Figure A.4: Demographic Transition: Alternative Scenarios - Long Run Effect
same rate on a BGP . Thus, on the BGP the set of conditions A.81 continue to
hold and gηt = gn,t.
Finally, when the productivity of robots changes, Robots Productivity, θt = θ¯A
μ
t
is no longer constant and as such using the system of equation A.80 we have that
gpM,t =
(
gq,t
θ¯Aμt−1
θ¯Aμt
)(1−α)(1−γI)
=
(
gt
gn,t
)(1−α)(1−γI)
= gpL,t, (A.82)
(gt)
η−1gq,t = 1, (A.83)
gAt = (gt/gn,t)
(ψ−1)(1−α)(1−γI) (A.84)
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Note: The figure plots the effects of the projected demographic changes under different specifications.
For Per Capita Output growth = (yt/yt−1)(Nt−1/Nt) we show the Change relative to the initial
BGP . For Share of Automated Sector - ym,t and Consumption - Ct/yt we show the percentage
change relative to the initial BGP .
Figure A.5: Impulse response to η Shock
F.5 Shock to η - Robots Production
In this section we show the effect of a shock to η in the benchmark model and in
the model with automation and capital skill complementarities.
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